In the heat of September 8, 2025, while curfew loomed and fear gripped the streets, bullets rang out for hours in Nepal. Protesters fell, chaos reigned, and country’s top leadership, then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak, Inspector General of Police Chandrakuber Khapung, stood largely silent. An official investigation now confirms what many suspected; key figures did little to stop the bloodshed. And their inaction had deadly consequences.
The inquiry, conducted by a specially formed fact-finding commission, looked closely at the events of September 8 and 9. Its findings, released in stages last week, point to negligence, mismanagement, and missed opportunities at the very top of Nepal’s political and security hierarchy.
Hours of gunfire, days of silence
The first shock came on September 8. Protests erupted in Kathmandu Valley, and over four hours, live bullets were fired at demonstrators. Despite real-time intelligence from the field, the commission found, no one in the top leadership took meaningful steps to halt the violence or initiate dialogue.
The commission’s report recommends criminal proceedings against Oli, Lekhak, and Khapung under Sections 181 and 182 of Nepal’s Criminal Code. These laws make it illegal to act negligently or recklessly in ways that can kill people. Offenders under Section 181 face 3 to 10 years in prison and fines between NPR 30,000 to 100,000. Section 182 prescribes up to three years in prison and a fine of NPR 30,000 for reckless acts leading to death.
Who else faces the music?
The investigation did not spare bureaucrats and security officials. Former Home Secretary Gokarnmani Duwadi, Armed Police Chief Raju Aryal, former NID Chief Hutaraj Thapa, and Kathmandu CDO Shivilal Rijal were recommended for prosecution under Section 182 for recklessness.
Meanwhile, current Police Chief Dan Bahadur Karki faces departmental action for failing to maintain office security and weapon control as per police regulations. In total, four army officials, five Nepal Police officers, and three Armed Police personnel were recommended for disciplinary action.
Among the army officials were:
- Manojkumar Baidwar, head of the security team at the President’s residence, Shital Niwas
- Divakar Khadka, security head at the Prime Minister’s official residence, Baluwatar
- Ganesh Khadka, security chief at Singha Durbar Secretariat
- Santosh Dhungel, leading the army security at the Parliament complex
The report also flagged Police Operation Commander AIG Siddhi Bikram Shah, DIG Ombahadur Rana, former Kathmandu Police Chief Bishwodhar Acharya, SSP Deep Shamsher Jabara, and SP Rishiram Kandel for disciplinary action. Armed Police officers AIG Narayandatt Paudel, DIG Suresh Kumar Shrestha, and SP Jeevan KC were also included.
From the National Investigation Department, Deputy Director Krishna Prasad Khanal and Deputy Investigation Director Reben Kumar Gachhadar were recommended for action under military, police, Armed Police, and special services laws.
September 9: A separate disaster
While September 8 saw bullets fly, September 9 descended into unprecedented destruction. The commission highlighted the failure of the National Security Council, which is meant to assess threats and deploy forces effectively. Even after 19 protesters died on September 8, the Council did not fully evaluate the potential risks for the next day.
The report paints a grim picture. Top leaders including Prime Minister ignored early warnings. Minor and verbal decisions were made but no formal, written instructions were issued to manage the crisis. Social media restrictions were imposed without studying potential consequences. And, no concrete measures like military deployment to protect civilians, were taken.
The Prime Minister’s role: Accountability or evasion?
The report is clear. Being the head of state meant Oli was ultimately responsible for both the successes and failures of his administration. It criticises attempts to shift accountability to local administrators, stating that the human cost of the September events could have been mitigated if the leadership had coordinated with security agencies and intervened promptly.
The investigation also points out that Oli’s attempts to strengthen the National Investigation Department did not translate into effective preventive measures. Miscalculations were made in crowd estimates, security plans fell short, and the Prime Minister’s office did not act decisively on intelligence reports.
Ignored warnings and past failures
The commission noted prior lapses, including the incident at Tinkune, which were never properly investigated. Past weaknesses in police administration were not addressed that left system ill-prepared for the September unrest.
Even after 19 fatalities on the evening of September 8, no high-level assessment or contingency planning was conducted for the following day. Coordination with the army could have reduced casualties, but that did not happen.
The mechanics of September 9 destruction
The events involved planned, systematic attacks on state infrastructure. The commission’s report detailed a chilling pattern:
- CCTV systems were destroyed first
- Water tanks were emptied and equipment sabotaged
- Data centers and computer rooms were targeted
- Documents were set on fire
- Looting followed
- Fires were eventually set using gas cylinders or petrol bottles
Tests conducted in India confirmed petroleum residues. They showed premeditation in the destruction of important government buildings like Singha Durbar, Parliament, Supreme Court, and Shital Niwas.
The commission admitted that the mandate was short and could not fully cover the nationwide incidents. It recommended forming an expert investigative team to cross-check evidence, videos, witness accounts to identify perpetrators and deliver justice.
Legal complexity: The challenge of prosecution
Former police officials pointed out limitations in legal timelines. Some acts committed during September 9, including arson and possession of weapons, may no longer be prosecutable due to statutes of limitation. Others remain actionable, but prompt legal processes are critical.
In terms of using firearms, the law allows Chief District Officers to authorise shooting in self-defense or to protect critical infrastructure. Field officers can use force, but only under specific legal parameters.
Public access and government transparency
Following media reports, Prime Minister Sushila Karki decided to formally release the commission’s findings. Press advisor Ram Bahadur Rawal confirmed that the report, along with reports on child welfare and good governance roadmap 2082, will be archived at the Federal Parliament Secretariat library and made public.
This move comes after weeks of speculation while citizens are demanding transparency and accountability for events.
Commission findings
The investigation paints comprehensive picture of failure:
- Top political and security leaders failed to act despite warnings
- Coordination among police, army, intelligence agencies was insufficient
- Preventive measures for September 9 were inadequate
- Social media restrictions and emergency powers were imposed without assessing consequences
- Some officials acted recklessly or negligently while others performed admirably
While prosecution and disciplinary actions are now recommended, report stresses the need for systemic reform in Nepal’s security and governance apparatus.
Nepal now faces challenge of reconciling with this dark chapter in its history.
