The horrific Pulwama massacre on 14 February signifies a new high in the cycle of terrorist attacks and, forebodingly, this tragedy is unlikely to be the last for the state and the country as a whole. We may need to keep the calculus of the terrorist in the focus of our response so as to not to play into his hands.

Terrorism, by its very nature, does not lend itself to neat solutions, for the combating sides, unlike military conflict between armies. J&K has seen it for nearly 30 years which means that a whole generation of adults has not experienced anything but violence in which they are, usually, in the cross-fire ~ exactly the strategy of Jaish-e-Muhammed and its ilk. This strategy ~ or, rather the grand strategy ~ of these outfits and their official patrons, which is only to be expected, of ever-increasing brazenness of attacks makes the situation in the State a lethal mix of external and domestic factors; the disturbed internal conditions have bred, in varying degrees, unease, sullenness or alienation amongst the residents. This brazenness can be expected to increase as Pakistan’s military’s assistance is being sought by various global and regional powers to achieve a favourable outcome, from their respective points of view, in the Afghan political imbroglio. With their national pursuits being what they are, we should not expect anyone else to bail us out.

Pulwama was no different from the syndrome. As reported in the media, the emboldened groups of local residents have clearly shown sympathy to the suicide bomber. Even in the presence of journalists, many visitors to the house of the bomber were, in fact, congratulating his father rather than distancing themselves from this abominable act. This atrocity took place a few kilometres from his village; intriguingly, it was a carefully prepared plan which would require a support base for collecting RDX, rigging it into a bomb, procuring a vehicle and emplacing the explosives for detonation. As recently as 18 February, whilst a quite sophisticated gunfight between the security forces and exceptionally trained terrorists, including Pakistanis, a section of the security forces was keeping a good number of local residents from surrounding the area to enable the terrorists to get away, a not unfamiliar situation in the Valley. Certainly, there is local sympathy, a degree of radicalisation, and a fidayeen mindset due to the grassroots’ propaganda on the part of the Pakistani-inspired terrorist groups. This aggravated situation, contributing to the plight of the people of Kashmir as well as of the country, due to public alienation is the result of the ineffectiveness and weakness of political parties there which should, in fact, be engaged in neutralising this propaganda through political mobilisation at the grassroots’ level.

While the security forces must do their job providing security to the local people, the political parties are failing in their role which they are meant for. Being largely family or individual-run parties, they lack democratic culture within the organisations and empowered grassroots’ members motivated enou-gh to broaden their support base amongst the local communities; even the BJP has not been able to overcome its limitations, due to its eagerness to retain the loyalty of its somewhat restricted base in Jammu, to expand its influence in the Valley. Thus, the existing political parties in the State are not able to work amongst the grassroots communities which become easily susceptible to the toxic propaganda of radical elements. The task of restoring the ‘political’ order is left to the coercive power of the state while the political parties wait on the sidelines; in the process, it assumes the optics of a confrontation between the central government ~ or, ‘India’ ~ and the local communities or the ‘Kashmiris’.

In this tense atmosphere, there has to be an almost paranoid obsession with constant review of security procedures since any lapses can, potentially, have disastrous consequences for the country. Already, comments have been made about the advisability of such a large convoy ~ providing a wide front for attack ~ passing through an area where the security forces were, and continue to be, engaged in intense anti-Jaish operations combined with open warnings from the latter about revenge. Smaller groups of security personnel, better monitoring including aerial, screening of vehicles on the road and those entering midway through local police presence, multiple layers of live monitoring of an ongoing movement ~ an ‘operation’ of its own kind ~ should help in ensuring critical, instantaneous review of operating presuppositions even as it is going on.

There is no doubt that lack of action to such a grave provocation would be seen as a sign of weakness amongst the decision-makers in Pakistan. Both Kargil and the ‘surgical strike’ provide a model for a calibrated but sharp action from our part to stem the increasing lethality of cross-border terrorism. Both these episodes caused major political and military turmoil in Pakistan leading, in first instance, to its pusillanimous climbdown and military coup and, in the second instance, to political instability and , eventually, the departure of the Prime Minister: the upshot, in both instances, was the weakening of national will, even if that was a temporary phenomenon. The other was its failed nuclear brinkmanship which it has been threatening to engage in during confrontations with India. The reasons for this are international sympathy towards India’s kinetic action which opened the window for the latter to neutralise the pressure on it during the course of that action. A clear, publicly available evidence weakens the hand of the official ‘handlers’ of terrorists; both the political and the military leadership lose face even amongst the Pakistani public who are embarrassed at their country being perceived as a terrorist state.

A larger warlike intent against Pakistan, as a whole, has the effect of the broader public uniting behind its leadership, especially the Army, whereas the Indian interest is better served without it. Thus, the logic of both Kargil and the ‘surgical strike’ was limited military action in the border areas against terrorists’ movements/launching pads but not aimed at the country’s existence as a whole. The added advantage was the increasing concern and protests amongst the residents in the POK who felt, according to confirmed media reports, that they were the victims of cross-border terrorism. Given our stronger military presence on the LOC/international border, a message needs to be conveyed, on a constant basis, that any suspected militant movement across the border would invite devastating punishment on the Pakistani military post whose complicity would be taken as a given. This pressure, on the military posts opposite, has to be constant and not episodic as was the case with the ‘surgical strike’ and any Pakistani military response to such a military posture on the Indian side has to be factored into this matrix.

Our approach to handling of the increasing threat of Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism has to be twofold embracing both the external and the internal dimensions. It also requires building up on our earlier approaches which yielded the desired outcomes. As we increase the military pressure on Pakistan, widening the opening for it through our diplomacy of putting it on the defensive, a political consolidation at the grassroots against externally sponsored terrorist propaganda is also a must which makes demands on the mainstream political forces active in the entire state and which is only possible through greater democratisation of their internal organisations as enjoined by the relevant national laws. As already evident, anything otherwise would lead to greater polarisation amongst the communities in the state, the spillover of this polarisation into other parts of the country, increasing populist pressure on the government for a quick and ‘final’ solution, and teetering from one disastrous national crisis to yet another uncontrolled, catastrophic one!

(The writer is a former Ambassador who has served in Islamabad and Central Asian capitals and dealt with Afghanistan affairs. He can be reached at mr_yogendra_ kumar@hotmail.com)