The US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, is in India for his maiden visit, as part of his South Asia tour which would also possibly take him to Afghanistan. He comes to India after visiting Pakistan, where he would have only heard a collection of complaints against India, including their desperate objections to its enhanced role in Afghanistan.

While his recent statements concerning growing relations between the US and India are making news, there are doubts on the American approach to Pakistan.

The US seeks closer cooperation with India at the strategic level to counter China, as also play a greater role in stabilising and developing Afghanistan. Regular visits by the Afghan president to India only indicate their dependence on India. On the other hand, Pakistan, the main architect behind US failures, seeks the opposite. It has been crying itself hoarse about reducing India’s influence in Afghanistan, while it contributes nothing, other than supporting groups that bleed the country.

The US policy towards Pakistan under Donald Trump has witnessed a reversal from previous administrations. Earlier it used a carrot and stick policy, which included providing Pakistan military hardware and finances to obtain support in curbing antiAfghan terror groups on its soil.

The US did nothing even when Osama bin Laden was traced and eliminated on Pakistani soil. The US only got more casualties and empty promises in return. It remains dependent on Karachi port for its forces, hence needs to handle Pakistan with caution.

The present US South Asian strategy was developed by serving and retired generals with vast experience in Afghanistan and in handling the duplicity of Pakistan. They recommended a reverse of the carrot and stick policy, where the stick came first, which immediately began producing results.

In the initial phase, Pakistan was lambasted by Trump and his chief advisors, making their security establishment nervous enough to reconsider its approach.
The very mention of an increased role for India in Afghanistan, made the Pakistan army chief rush to Kabul offering all forms of assistance, including joint operations, desperately seeking Kabul’s support against an enhanced Indian role. Their prime minister and defence and foreign ministers decried increasing Indian footprints in Afghanistan at every possible forum.

Subsequently and only when their foreign minister admitted that terror groups do exist within the country and Pakistan needs time to dismantle them, was the stick pulled back. Pakistan had accepted and indicated a willingness to act, contrary to its earlier denials.
The recent action of the Pakistani army in rescuing a US-Canadian family kidnapped five years ago indicated a mild change in policy.

The announcement of the success of the operation by Pakistan was countered by the CIA, when it stated that the captives had remained in Pakistan all through and close to the HQs of the Haqqani network. This only proved that Pakistan could act, but only when pressurised.
The fact that none of the captors were arrested or killed raised doubts about whether it was a military operation or a ploy to befool the US.

There have also been comments in the media that Pakistan acted because a message was conveyed that a possible Bin Laden type surgical operation may be undertaken. This would have been a massive and degrading blow to their army.

After the incident, US drone strikes have increased along the PakAfghan border, targeting militant groups operating in the region. A number of these strikes have occurred on Pakistani soil, which their prime minister brushed away stating they were along the un-delineated border.

Pakistan has refrained from adversely commenting on the strikes, solely because it fears the stick coming into play again. The US continues to warn Pakistan for its lack of resolve in curbing these groups especially as Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces are suddenly on the rise.

This would have been the message Tillerson would have conveyed to Pakistan. In the same breath, the US openly calls India a major strategic partner. It is in this complicated atmosphere that Tillerson arrives in Delhi.

The visit has deliberately been coincided with a visit by the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani. This would convey a message of a joint strategic approach, which could then be conveyedto Pakistan by the US at an appropriate time. The US wants support from India in many fields, hence it should be willing to include Indian considerations while handling Pak.

The US is keen for Indo-Pak talks to resume, but at the same time is aware of the Indian stand, ‘terror and talks cannot go hand in hand’. Further, both nations realise the level of fear within the Pakistani establishment of an increased Indian footprint in Afghanistan.

India is already training the Afghan army, as also providing it military hardware and developmental assistance. It recently signed an agreement to commence training the Afghan police, hence now possesses influence in every field of the Afghan security forces.

India’s agreement to the American desire that it enhance assistance to Afghanistan should be conditional on Washington pressuring Pakistan to do more in curtailing anti-India terror groups operating from its soil. Pakistan is a master in duplicity, making promises but refusing to adhere to them. India possesses first-hand knowledge of Pakistan’s duplicity, having witnessed regular turnarounds on the talks issue and hence can correctly convey the message.

The message to Pakistan through the US should be clear. India is investing in Afghanistan, hence wants a say in the political affairs of the nation. If Pakistan desires that India not be involved in the political future of Afghanistan, but solely in development, then it must curb its anti-India activities, including terror groups.

Failure to do so would result in enhanced Indian influence in Afghanistan, increasing the threat to Pakistan. With Ashraf Ghani being in Delhi at the same time, this message would carry immense weight and create more internal worry in Pakistan.

Tillerson’s visit is an opportunity which India should exploit for cornering Pakistan.
(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)