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Understand before you criticise

The recent comments against those supporting militants in the valley by the army chief have been criticized by politicians and…

Understand before you criticise

PHOTO: AFP

The recent comments against those supporting militants in the valley by the army chief have been criticized by politicians and armchair journalists and strategists. However, few of those negative comments comprehend the true situation. As the snow recedes, operations against militants who had managed to cross have intensified across the valley. Operations are against both local as well as infiltrated militants. In most cases, militants are trapped in villages, raising questions of whether they have local support or have barged in forcibly.

Most recent encounters have been partially successful due to stone pelting and movement towards encounter sites by locals, compelling security forces to adhere to increased precautions to avoid civilian casualties. This distraction results in increased losses to security forces and enables militants to escape. While the army does not get involved with stone-throwers, leaving this to the police to handle, recent incidents have highlighted their impact on operations. The army has also discarded the use of heavy weapons which could destroy residential accommodation where militants hide, mainly to safeguard civilian property.

They are forced to battle under severe restrictions, constraints never placed on any military across the globe. In its recent counter-strike against militants, after the blast in the Sufi Mosque in Sehwan, Pakistan openly employed air and artillery firepower, unmindful of collateral damage. The issue which arises is whether the sacrifice of Indian jawans’ lives are justified and for how long can we expect the army to continue to suffer casualties when those whom they seek to protect attack them, providing militants a chance to escape with their lives.

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Stone throwing and adopting an anti-Indian stance is not a recent phenomenon in the valley. It has existed for decades. Excessive deployment of the army and its lack of retaliation against provocation by the locals have only emboldened them, especially as they continue to be supported by Pakistan and the separatists. If no action is taken, they are likely to become more violent. Even criminal law terms an accessory to murder guilty for the crime; hence stone-throwers and agitators who disrupt activities resulting in additional casualties are legally guilty.

Each soldier who is involved in operations is also a father, a son or a husband, as are the locals. The soldier is involved in operations not for sacrificing his life, but to eliminate those who threaten the fabric of the country. There is thus a need to re-think and analyse the strategy which is presently in vogue and possibly adopt a hard-line approach, ignoring any criticism, local or international.

Those armchair journalists, politicians and strategists who seek to criticise the army chief’s statement should understand that the situation existing in the valley is the culmination of a series of failures of successive governments, both at the Centre and in the state. None of the critics has either faced a bullet or lost loved ones to militant bullets, hence can easily pass judgement from the safety of secure homes.

No militancy has ever been curbed by treating every civilian resident in the area as an enemy and therefore there is a need to segregate those with or against the state. To move people away from the clutches of militants, the army had adopted a policy of winning hearts and minds, while simultaneously battling militancy. It had expended colossal funds and effort by establishing schools, implementing developmental projects and conducting medical camps. It has always provided amenities to the local public, when the state machinery has failed.

In places where residents interfere with anti-militancy operations, these projects should be temporarily closed for security reasons. A clear message would then be conveyed that if you desire support from the state, then you need to support the state. It can no longer be a one-way traffic, nor can the government be taken for granted. The army is the instrument of last resort; hence whenever it has been deployed to restore a situation beyond the local civil authorities it has ensured peace, whether it is Haryana, Gujarat or any other state. It is a respected force when so deployed. Its attitude in the valley needs to change to regain this stance.

Hence, those indulging in stone throwing or disrupting operations need to be engaged as enemies of the state and treated at par with militants. The police and Special Operations Group of the J and K police should be tasked to deal firmly with those disrupting operations, including by opening fire, while the army battles militants.

If the British government could enact an order suspending human rights laws on the battlefield as late as October 2016, we too could consider strengthening AFSPA in the valley, as we battle anti-national elements and their supporters. There is a feeling within governments at the state and Centre that the situation that prevailed last summer should not be allowed to recur. This message has also been conveyed to the security forces, who are compelled to be more cautious about civilian casualties than their own. It is time the government takes a holistic view of the prevailing situation and allows security forces more freedom and laxity in their operations. Firmness and strictness in dealing with the situation would bring normalcy faster than mollycoddling the populace.

Those who sit and criticise should spend time with troops and understand the deep tensions and pressures under which they operate, rather than bank on their limited knowledge, gleaned from movies, videos and interactions with anti-national elements. Firm decisions need to be considered and implemented as early as possible. With summer approaching, the valley is likely to be again on the boil, with increased infiltration. The army cannot afford to be battling both militants and their local supporters. The hierarchy of the army and the government must agree to new rules of engagement, before the army suffers abnormal casualties, affecting morale and efficiency.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)

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