Donald Trump has unveiled a purported National Security Strategy. On closer reflection, it isn’t a strategy; at best an attempt to adjust the worldwide perception of his foreign policy ~ generally uncharitable ~ with the proposed plan of action. While producing the document is a legal requirement, abiding by its provisions is not. Thus even as a signal of intent, it is unlikely to be convincing, far less credible. The nub of the matter must be that the present administration, even after close to a year in office, has no calculated roadmap. As often as not, it cuts a sorry figure when its members contradict each other.

The President’s observation on Twitter that “America is determined to win” is merely a rhetorical charade which shall not overshadow the current isolation over dropping climate-change from the list of global threats. Double-think runs wild in the document’s reference to Russia and China, when both powers appear to be inching towards the US; in effect the Kremlin and the White House had relegated the Cold War to the limbo of history. Far from a forthright enunciation of the paradigm shift, both Russia and China have been declared as “revisionist powers” that are trying to “shape a world antithetical to US values and interests”. Astonishing is the disconnect after the widely discussed Russian support to ensure Trump’s victory and Hillary Clinton’s defeat. Likewise, there has been a similar mending of fences with Beijing.

The criticism of Moscow is striking. Post the electoral flirtation, the document has accused Russia of interfering in the domestic political affairs of other countries. Markedly, it has skirted the evidence of its meddling in the 2016 election, let alone the FBI’s probe into his campaign’s alleged collusion. Given that the President and his Republican cabal have consistently debunked the inquiry, it is open to question whether the White House will pursue a tougher stance towards Russia.

The remarks on China are milder in comparison, and the document acknowledges the need for cooperation not least in view of North Korea’s nuclear threat. The hard reality must be that China is becoming ever so powerful, and wants to shape its international rules of engagement according to its lights. This is the major challenge in contemporary geostrategy. In point of fact, Trump’s America needs Xi’s China to confront North Korea. Whether the regime in Beijing is ideologically “revisionist”, as Mr Trump contends, or revolutionary is of relatively lesser moment in the overall construct. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has been binned, without offering an alternative for US engagement in the region. Tackling Iran’s nuclear proliferation programme remains another prickly issue. The document, that has been packaged as “strategy”, lacks consistency and cohesion and is marked by flights of whimsy, wishful thinking, and subjective reflection. These infirmities can’t be papered over by calling India a leading global power.