Shifting dynamics of live-in relationships

As the states of Assam, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh prepare for enactment of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) following Uttarakhand which became the first in the country to do so, the discourse around UCC pertaining to individual rights is under much discussion. Amongst these, the regulation of Live -in Relationships (LIRs) is the most under-examined one. The Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code Act, 2024, introduced a mandatory registration framework for LIRs and prescribed legal consequences for non-compliance.

Similar proposals and legislative initiatives on this aspect are emerging from Assam and Gujarat too, reflecting a broader trend towards greater state regulation of intimate relationships outside marriage. These acts depart from the jurisprudential insights of the Supreme Court, which has consistently recognised adults’ autonomy to choose their partners and pursue their intimate lives free from unnecessary state interference. By requiring adults to disclose their status to the government or face criminal punishment, such regulations are prima facie inconsistent with the guarantees of privacy, autonomy, and equality enshrined in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.

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The underlying issue is not whether the State has the competence to regulate family law, but whether it can actually bring a level of surveillance on consensual adult relationships in manner that makes it difficult to align with democratic principles. Prior to the enactment of the UCC, whenever a matter concerning the regulation of live-in couples came before High Courts and the Apex Court, they based their decision on constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality and individual autonomy.

These mostly talked of void status of laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights (Article 13), equality and non-discrimination (Articles 14 and 15(3)) and just, fair and reasonable action by the state (Article 19 and 21). The Supreme Court in Indira Sharma versus VKV Sharma held that LIRs consisting of cohabitation and pre-marital sex, if consensual, do not constitute criminal conduct. With the enactment of these UCCs, a paradigm shift can be seen in the relationship between the state and the individual.

The laws of Uttarakhand, Part 3, Sec 378 mandate that both partners in a live-in relationship must submit a statement to the Registrar; Sec 380 addresses situations where live-in relationships are not registered and provides for cases in which a partner who is already married cannot live in a live-in relationship. It goes against the judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018). While the case of Joseph Shine primarily dealt with the constitutionality of the adultery offence, the Court’s broader reasoning emphasised that marriage does not liquidate adults’ decisional autonomy, dignity, privacy and sexual agency. The Court decision has made it clear that rule of law does not create a majoritarian consensus.

By prohibiting persons who are already married from entering into a live-in relationship and subjecting such relationships to state scrutiny, Section 380 of Uttarakhand’s UCC appears to reintroduce a form of state control over intimate choices that the case of Joseph Shine cautioned against. Further, Sec 384 mandates that upon termination of a live-in relationship, the partners must submit a statement to that effect. Sec 386 empowers the Registrar to initiate penal action if they fail to report within 30 days of the establishment of their relationship. The provision creates the possibility of intrusive state scrutiny of intimate relationships.

Based on the judgement of KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. Vs Union of India and Ors, it is clear that on a conjoint reading of Articles 19 and 21, an individual has the freedom to choose a partner. The state should not interfere unnecessarily. The right to live according to one’s own choice constitutes the bedrock of dignity and personal liberty. Sec 387 makes it an offence and provides for a punishment of 3 months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs 25,000 or both.

It violates the canon of penal law that punishment is the ultima ratio. Criminal sanctions shall not be employed merely to enforce prevailing moral preferences. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court held that constitutional morality is distinct from social morality. The Constitution protects intimate decision-making even when such choices depart from prevailing social morality. Additionally, Uttarakhand UCC rules 2025, Chapter 5, Rule No. 15, require information on the previous relationship status as a mandatory requirement for LIR registration. Sections 384 to 395 of the corresponding law in Assam have similar provisions for couples in live-in relationships. Sections 384 to 395 of the corresponding act in Gujarat apply similar provisions to live-in couples.

These provisions are also not in consonance with Article 12 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which establishes the fundamental right to privacy and that to form a family respectively. The essential definition of LIRs remains elusive. Unlike marriage, it is extremely amorphous and legal intervention to regulate it violates basic human rights and is a question mark over the right of adult citizens of the country to have the agency to decide their partners for themselves. The law singles out adults in live-in relationships for compulsory disclosure and potential penal consequences while no comparable obligation is imposed on married couples to periodically report the existence or continuation of their intimate relationships to the State.

The differential treatment appears difficult to justify, particularly when both relationships involve consenting adults exercising their personal choices. Moreover, under Article 14, a live-in relationship cannot be treated as a category distinct from the individual. In the context of understanding women’s empowerment indicators, this becomes even more problematic, especially in a country and society where women’s lives are largely governed by patriarchal social norms that regulate their fundamental life decisions. Thus, the constitutional issues surrounding the compulsory registration of LIRs are not merely about legislative authority; they hinge on fundamental rights.

Additionally, the rise of differing State-level Uniform Civil Codes poses a conceptual dilemma if various States implement distinct civil codes; achieving legal uniformity across India becomes increasingly challenging. Uniformity, by its very nature, cannot b e realise d amidst a variety of conflicting legal frameworks across territorial jurisdictions.

(The writers are, respectively, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi; lecturer in Law and Criminology, Royal Holloway, University of London and a Commonwealth Scholar, and a Junior Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Prime Minister’s Museum and Library, New Delhi.)