In the flurry of diplomacy, Japan as a stakeholder is at once pleased and worried. Pleased, because if Pyongyang does indeed abide by its announcement to give up nuclear weapons, the immediate threat to its territory would be removed.

It bears recall that the fear in Japan was real when North Korea fired two intercontinental ballistic missiles last year that flew over its northern island of Hokkaido. Japan is equally worried because if the Trump-Kim summit ends in failure, the situation will be more serious than it is at present.

But the manner in which developments on the Korean Peninsula took place so quickly that Japan felt rattled and has legitimate reason to feel sidelined as it was never consulted either by the US or South Korea or on whatever decisions were taken on the Korean issue.

What then are Japan’s options? Apart from the security issue, Japan has other matters to tackle. For Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, resolving the abduction issue is one of the main priorities.

When Japan felt overlooked for a role, Abe flew to Washington on 17 April ahead of the Moon-Kim summit on 27 April and the forthcoming Trump-Kim summit on 12 June in Singapore for a talk with Trump lest Japan is not forgotten.

Japan was even touchy when information about the dessert menu for Moon-Kim summit made way to the media. When Japan learnt that Moon planned to serve Kim a mango mousse decorated with a map of the Korean Peninsula that includes islands over which Tokyo claims sovereignty, Japan lodged an official complaint with its neighbour.

The protest over the dessert menu might look ludicrous, but it speaks volumes of the long-simmering tensions between the two allies. The disputed islands, in the sea between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, are known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan.

South Korea regularly depicts the islands on official maps, and Japan just as regularly lodges a protest. The speed at which the summit-level diplomacy is playing out, Abe has been cautiously working overtime to keep Japan relevant in regional diplomacy, which is why he travelled to Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Florida, to secure Trump’s agreement to seek the total abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes in his talks with Kim, and to press for the return of Japanese citizens abducted by the North in the 1970s and 1980s.

He also spoke with Moon over the phone, seeking a commitment before the latter’s summit with Kim. Yet, Japan seems to be less confident on the assurances received from both Moon and Trump, given the history of the North going back on commitments. Japan does not trust the words of North Korea.

Dealing with two mercurial leaders ~ Trump and Kim ~ has been Japan’s biggest dilemma. While Kim has been unpredictable with his actions, Trump represents a volatile factor on the US side.

Japan appears to have realised that Trump’s sense of the alliance relationship is different than earlier US Presidents such as Barack Obama, George W Bush and Ronald Reagan who had always stood by the spirit of the alliance. Trump is perceived to be prone to exploit US alliance partners if the situation is in America’s favour.

This trust deficit is getting further exacerbated as talks on the reduction of the US forces deployed in Korea are doing the rounds as an inducement to Kim so that the outlook for the summit can look promising.

Since Moon is seeking a peace treaty with North Korea, if he ultimately accepts the North’s demand for reduction or withdrawal of US troops from Korea as a prerequisite to the removal of nuclear weapons, it would alarm Japan as it benefits from the US military protection in the region.

Japan’s biggest worry might be an impulsive desire on the part of Trump to declare a quick victory, even at the cost of Japan’s security and therefore the US President might accept something short of complete denuclearisation.

Tokyo fears that Trump could accept Kim’s recent announcement of no longer conducting nuclear tests or long-range missile tests, thereby accepting the North’s intention to keep whatever nuclear weapons it has.

This means that if the North continues to maintain its arsenal of short and medium-range missiles as part of the deal that can reach Japan, the latter’s vulnerability would not have diminished a bit.

Would Trump be further encouraged to accept such a deal, thereby strengthening his candidature to win the Nobel Peace Prize as proposed by Moon and other liberal lawmakers in the US? In that event, Japan’s dilemma would persist.

Kim might be keen to shed his image of being a tyrant and brute ruler and offer some more olive branches to Trump and one could see some of his image makeover in the manner in which he conducted himself while meeting Moon.

Japan suspects Kim’s announcement, as observed in the right-leaning Yomiuri Shimbun, “a tactic to weaken the pressure of the international community’s sanctions” and that “there was no mention of any intention to abandon nuclear and ballistic missiles” in the Panmunjom Declaration.

What is problematic is that the definition of ‘denuclearisation’ is interpreted variously in the US, North Korea and Japan. Trump might see some value in keeping Japan nervous as well as he could have a mind to extract some other concessions on trade from Japan.

Seen differently, Trump may be keeping Japan’s security deliberately vulnerable as that could compel Japan to buy more weapons for whatever price the US sets. The return of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago is also a priority for Japan, and Prime Minister Abe is committed to resolve this long-pending issue.

Abe extracted a promise from Trump during his meeting with him on April 17 that the latter would raise the issue when he meets with Kim. He has requested Moon as well. Trump could raise this issue but it remains unclear if he would seek any specific action from Kim on this. And that might not please Abe and Japan.

Japan’s security dilemma could also override other considerations if Tokyo finds itself suddenly confronting a situation in which Moon, in his over-enthusiasm to unify the peninsula, could start pulling away from the US and be drawn further towards China, a North Korean ally.

In such a situation, Japan could find itself in an extremely difficult situation. If the Korean peninsula comes under Chinese influence with US forces returning home, Japan’s security posture could be dramatically altered. It may even take a call on its nuclear option, as it would no longer be able to rely on US nuclear deterrence.

To avert such a situation, Abe is also exploring the possibility of holding a separate summit with Kim. So far, Kim has not responded. Japan might not hesitate to use its economic card to rebuild North’s economy in the larger interest of securing its security and that could be possible if the North decides to come out of its self-imposed isolation.

Kim might as well seize this opportunity to seek his pound of flesh as Japan, which ruled the Korean Peninsula for 35 years as its colony till its capitulation in World War II, paid reparation to South Korea in 1965 but not yet to the North. Japan’s vulnerability could be North Korea’s opportunity and the choice is for the latter.

(Concluded)

The writer, former Senior Fellow, IDSA, was until recently ICCR Chair at Reitaku University, Japan. The views expressed are personal and do not represent either that of the ICCR or the Government of India.