As the peace-wind starts sweeping across the Korean Peninsula with the first of the formal Inter-Korean summit talks scheduled to be held on April 27 at the border village of Panmunjom, expectations are high for an enduring peace in the peninsula after an ominously disturbing phase in 2017 in the wake of North Korea’s serial missile blasts.

Preceding this, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, made his first overseas visit to Beijing for talks with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. What prompted Kim to undertake this sudden journey to China is far from clear, and there could be several possibilities.

One credible explanation is the mutual recognition of the relevance of China’s equation with North Korea, often referred to as lips-and-teeth relationship, the importance of which cannot be undermined despite periodic hiccups.

It is common knowledge that Beijing was alarmed in 2017 when Pyongyang indulged in a series of provocative acts, such as conducing nuclear tests and launching missiles, and thus incurring stringent sanctions by the UN Security Council.

But the strategic considerations are so critical that Beijing is unlikely ever to abandon North Korea despite the latter’s recklessness.

Even earlier, China had tried to mediate in the peninsula by organising the Six-Party Talks, by associating Japan, both the Koreas, Russia and the United States in the exercise.

That effort appeared to be sincere, but after initial expression of optimism, it tapered off after Pyongyang walked out. Now, Kim’s surprising decision to travel to Beijing to meet Xi has provided another opportunity to China to prove that it continues to remain relevant.

But the more important reason why Kim is anxious to meet Xi is that the North Korean leader wants to take China into confidence before his summit with President Donald Trump in May.

It is a fair guess that Kim wants to secure Beijing’s support if the summit with Trump does not produce any tangible result. Coming ahead of the Kim-Trump summit, Kim’s visit to Beijing and his meeting with Xi is aimed at improving the position of both countries.

In the meantime, Beijing is keen that Kim-Moon summit on April 24 proceeds smoothly. According to reports, Xi will send the State Councillor, Yang Jiechi, to Seoul soon after the Kim-Xi summit for a briefing on the upcoming Kim-Xi talks.

It would have been rather unusual for Kim, despite the recent acrimony between Beijing and Pyongyang, to have met Trump without interacting with Xi. That is unthinkable.

Though Kim never met a foreign leader since he assumed power in 2011, Kim just cannot overlook the fact that China still remains North Korea’s principal ally and No. 1 trading and economic partner, besides being its only major military ally. It would be naïve of other stakeholders if they do not recognise this important aspect of regional geopolitics.

One interpretation is that by reopening ties between the two Koreas ~ initiated by President Moon of South Korea ~ Pyongyang has been trying to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.

The danger is that Beijing could have felt marginalised. Kim’s subsequent visit to Beijing to meet President Xi dispelled such speculation. Both North Korea and China have remained as allies since the Korean War when Mao Zedong sent troops to support Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung.

Both countries still maintain a mutual defence treaty, under which they pledge to “immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” in the event of war or foreign attack. If Beijing was miffed at Pyongyang’s provocative acts in 2017, Kim’s visit to Beijing may have removed such doubts.

Assuming that Kim might have secured Beijing’s assurance and support, what happens if the Kim-Trump summit ends with a whimper? One possible outcome of such failure of diplomacy could be that the US will adopt a more coercive approach or even launch a military strike.

But now with a stable and positive relationship with China, Kim will be in a position to ensure that such a possiblily is averted. China has let it be known that it supports a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

It has, therefore, suggested a freeze-for-freeze solution to the current crisis, whereby the US and South Korea suspend joint military drills in return for North Korea suspending the testing of weapons.

Therefore, should the Kim-Trump summit come a cropper, China might be in a position to claim that it is the ultimate peacemaker. This is because Beijing would be far more willing than the US to tolerate a nuclear North Korea, at least in the short term.

In the unlikely situation of Kim proposing the Chinese-backed freeze-for-freeze, or a similar first step towards denuclearization and Trump rejecting, it would be the US that would seem to have been outflanked.

It requires shrewd diplomatic finesse from either side to create a situation to ensure that a degree of proposed denuclearization is on the table. Such a scenario would mean that the North stops its nuclear testing, but without sacrificing its existing deterrent capabilities and the US agreeing to the arrangement.

The North is extremely unlikely to alter its stated position that possession of nuclear arsenal is essential to preserve its existence.

With Kim reaching out to the US and China and with Russia possibly the next country for peace overtures, where does Japan find itself in this unfolding scenario? Vladimir Putin has been relatively friendly with Kim’s regime and has tried to bolster ties, despite sanctions.

North Korea’s foreign minister is expected to visit Russia soon. Japan has the legitimate fear of being marginalised, and is trying to play the catching-up game on its own to remain relevant in the peace process.

Mired as he is in a domestic corruption scandal involving his wife, Abe finds himself in the crossroad. Should he follow Washington’s lead or address the domestic constituency to deal with the long-pending abduction issue. Abe fears that its demand on the abduction issue runs the risk of being side-tracked and that he may be left out in the cold.

He might therefore try to reach out to meet Kim on his own. The cost could be excessively high as Kim might in return demand Japan to pay more for the damage caused by its 1910-45 colonisation of the Korean Peninsula. The bill could run into billions of dollars. Will Japan be ready to pay this price? There is no easy answer to this complicated Korean issue.

The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. The views expressed are personal and do not represent either that of the ICCR or the Government of India