Grey Zone Warfare

Grey-zone warfare is that space between peace and open conflict wherein coercion, deception and non-kinetic levers are used by nations to achieve their strategic goals. Cyber-attacks, economic coercion, organized criminal activities, and use of proxies, are resorted to in a gradual manner to achieve strategic objectives, without triggering military response. Use of subversive and/or coercive steps that fall below the threshold of a conventional conflict impacting national security adversely, poses a sustained, multi-domain, and acute challenge to the national security interests of India, given its geopolitical environment, large democratic polity, digitalising economy, and complex federal policing structure.

This challenge is a reality now, and it requires very deft and focussed co-ordination in view of national security challenges. There is a need for clarity of mission for agencies, improved civil-military coordination, investment in resilience and attribution capabilities, tighter regulatory frameworks for information and critical infrastructure, and expanded international cooperation. Targeted disinformation and influence campaigns, using social media platforms, tend to polarise domestic politics, undermine trust in institutions, and shape elite or public opinion on strategic issues such as caste and communal tensions, border issues, infrastructure projects, etc.

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India, with open media environments is quite susceptible to such threats. Recent developments in our neighbourhood, especially in Bangladesh, and Nepal, resulted mostly because of the effective mobilisation of masses, especially Gen Z, through social media campaigns by interested entities, which resulted in government change. Misinformation campaigns as tools of information warfare have been resorted to by the Chinese and Pakistanis frequently with an intention to disturb peace in India. Attacks on critical sectors like energy, power, transport, health, financial systems, government services etc. can create cascading economic and social disruption while masking the attacker’s identity.

Cyber capabilities are cheap to deploy and deniable. Chinese cyber-attacks are quite common in India. Recently there was a serious compromise of the system in AIIMS, Delhi, as well as the electric supply in Mumbai. Day in and day out numerous attempts are being thwarted by the alert cyber security system in our country, but the fact remains that it is a vulnerable area, and an adequate and appropriate response is required. Investment, trade dependencies, strategic infrastructure financing, or targeted commercial restrictions, can be weaponised to achieve political objectives without firing a shot.

Tariff war resorted to by the US is the most appropriate contemporary example in this regard. Support to insurgent groups, criminal networks (smuggling, narcotics, trafficking), and cross-border harassment, can be used to impose costs, and engage police, border guarding forces, and the security agencies endlessly. This type of warfare seriously impacts security and the law-and-order scenario, which in turn adversely affects the politico-socio-economic environment of the country. Narcotics has badly impacted us, as geographically we are sandwiched between the “Death Crescent” (Golden Crescent), and “Death triangle” (Golden Triangle), regions which are the largest suppliers of narcotic drugs in the world.

ISI-sponsored infusion of drugs from Death Triangle on the Western front has badly affected the youth of Punjab, Haryana, and J&K, and the pushing of drugs by insurgent groups in Myanmar in the North East having the tacit support of China, has a crippling effect on the youth of the North East. Both borders are very sensitive, and this proxy war by Pakistan and China is causing a lot of strain on the law enforcement agencies, and the socio-economic condition in these regions is a serious concern. Presently, with the changed scenario in Bangladesh, and increasing influence of Pakistan specially the ISI in Bangladesh, the situation has become more complex.

There is every likelihood that the ISI, as it is doing on the western front, will take advantage of the situation and will encourage the drug lords in the region to achieve its objective of weakening our country from within. There is reliable evidence that the colossal amount of money which is generated by drug trafficking is being used to sponsor terrorist, insurgent, and LWE activities in India. ISI, through organised gangsters, has already been majorly involved, and is a danger to the unity and integrity of India. Maritime routes in Bay of Bengal, Indian ocean, and Arabian sea have also been used extensively by these groups for drug trafficking, which has necessitated extremely well-oiled and efficient co-ordination between the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, R&AW, IB, and the State Police forces and their specialised units, across the country.

Law enforcement agencies (LEA) are always at the forefront in fighting many grey-zone effects. Cybercrime units of security agencies and police forces investigate cyber intrusions, state police counter social media influence campaigns that lead to public disorder, customs, and coast guard detect illicit logistics, and revenue intelligence agencies including the Enforcement Directorate, deal with anti-moneylaundering activities, and tracing illicit financing of proxies. However, several structural issues constrain LEA effectiveness: Capacity and technical skills gap: Sophisticated cyber, forensics, OSINT and digital investigations require specialist training and tools that many LEAs lack.

Legal and evidentiary thresholds: Proving state involvement in deniable operations is legally and technically hard; criminal laws are designed for discrete acts, not for sustained hybrid campaigns. Attribution challenges: Without credible attribution, political leaders hesitate to act; law enforcement action against proxies or networks often exposes them to complex international legal issues. Public trust and rights balancing: Responses that suppress free expression or overreach surveillance, risk undermining democratic legitimacy and feeding adversary narratives. These constraints show why Grey-zone responses cannot be left solely to the police, or to the armed forces. It requires integrated, legally grounded, and socially legitimate structures.

Use of legal measures, international fora, and treaty mechanisms to constrain or delegitimise the opponent’s actions is of utmost importance. Moreover, India’s federal structure divides policing between states and the Centre, and as such, coordinated, and rapid response across agencies is difficult at times. In this scenario, a whole-of-nation strategy should be adopted to effectively tackle the growing menace of Grey Zone warfare. This strategy should rest on integrated command and coordination. There should be clear roles, shared situational awareness, and rapid decision-making across central ministries, state governments, security forces, regulators and private sector partners.

Legislative changes should be made wherever necessary to cover cross-border cybercrime, foreign influence disclosures, and economic coercion, while protecting civil liberties. Forensic and intelligence capabilities should be upgraded across the agencies and the police, so as to attribute campaigns, and present evidence suitable for legal or diplomatic action. Critical infrastructure should be hardened, supply chains should be diversified, and societal resilience should be enhanced against misinformation and economic coercion.

Diplomatic, legal and coalition instruments (e.g., information-sharing, joint investigations, sanctions etc.) should be used effectively to raise the political cost of deniable coercion. Most importantly, there should be well calibrated non-kinetic responses, such as sanctions, public attribution and exposure campaigns, export controls, counter-narratives, and sudden regulatory actions against key adversary companies or actors, and resorting to legal and financial instruments (e.g., asset freezes) to raise costs for proxies and facilitators. Tackling grey zone warfare effectively requires a paradigm shift in security policy.

(The writer, a retired IPS officer, has served in various capacities including as Commissioner of Delhi Police, DG-BSF, DG-NCB, DG-BCAS and Special Director, CBI)