Field Marshal State

There is no officially published change in the numerical position of Pakistan’s Asim Munir in the Warrant of Precedence by virtue of his elevation to the rank of Field Marshal. Since the position of Field Marshal is honorary, the Government of Pakistan has stated that Munir would continue to serve as the Chief of the Army Staff, indicating that the promotion itself did not create a new constitutional or protocol office. While it remains the highest military rank in the Pakistan Army, it does not, by itself, confer any constitutional, extraconstitutional, or civilian role in the governance of the state.

It affords military stature and distinction alone. Any authority exercised by a Field Marshal derives from the office held under the Constitution or applicable law – not from the rank itself. Accordingly, the rank cannot legitimise an expansion into civilian domains or alter the constitutional distribution of executive authority. However, in practical terms, the Pakistan military has historically exercised significant de facto influence over the country’s political system, often extending beyond its formal, functional, and constitutional mandate.

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This distinction between formal legal authority and practical political influence remains central to understanding civil-military relations in Pakistan. The infamous remark attributed to General Zia-ul-Haq when questioned about constitutional limits remains telling: “The Constitution is only a booklet. I can tear it up and say that tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Is there anybody to stop me?” That same sentiment was echoed decades later by General Pervez Musharraf, who rationalised his 1999 seizure of power with the cold assertion: “What is the Constitution? It is but a piece of paper to be thrown into the dustbin.”

Today, Pakistan appears to be witnessing a similar expansion of military influence under Field Marshal Munir, who is publicly seen undertaking a range of activities extending beyond the traditional responsibilities of a military commander. These include engagements with foreign heads of government, visits to foreign capitals, meetings with diplomatic and economic stakeholders, participation in discussions on national economic priorities, and involvement in matters of domestic political and governance significance.

His engagements with international leaders and officials, including interactions in Tehran, Washington, and Gulf capitals, have placed him in a role resembling that of a strategic national representative or negotiator rather than solely that of a military commander. In yet another unusual assignment for a Field Marshal, the Pakistani federal government has now involved Munir in efforts to curb the country’s population growth rate. The rationale offered by Federal Health Minister Syed Mustafa Kamal for inducting the Field Marshal into this effort rests on the argument that the immense challenge of population management requires both government action and public participation.

Yet how a serving military commander fits into either of these civilian domains remains unclear. Population stabilisation typically requires expanding access to voluntary family planning, improving female education, enhancing women’s economic opportunities, reducing child mortality, strengthening healthcare systems, delaying marriage and first childbirth, addressing poverty and economic insecurity, conducting public awareness campaigns, and implementing carefully designed social and economic incentives. None of these interventions naturally require the expertise or participation of the head of a nuclearpowered military.

The Pakistani government may argue that population growth has broader national-security implications: unemployment, resource pressures, urbanisation, migration, education deficits, and social instability can all affect internal security. However, extending national security reasoning to justify military involvement in every major civilian challenge risks stretching the concept beyond meaningful limits.

While the military does possess a nationwide organisational structure, medical facilities, logistical networks, and administrative capacity that governments may utilise during emergencies or national campaigns, invoking this infrastructure for the purpose of reducing population growth is a striking example of expanding the military footprint into an essentially civilian policy domain. More importantly, such involvement symbolically normalises the expansion of the military’s role into virtually every field ~ whether directly related to defence or not ~ within what is commonly referred to as Pakistan’s “establishment” (read: the military).

It reinforces the perception that civilian institutions and democratically elected leaders are incapable of addressing national challenges without military intervention. Over time, the military risks becoming viewed as the ultimate problem-solver for every national issue, whether involving international mediation, diplomacy, economic management, or domestic governance. Such a pattern gradually blurs the constitutional distinction between defence responsibilities and civilian administration, creating expectations and preferences for direct military intervention.

Many critics argue that the current civil–military arrangement represents a favourable position for Field Marshal Munir: a situation in which he occupies a position of exceptional influence, with visibility across diplomatic, economic, security, and governance forums, while remaining formally outside direct civilian accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, military leadership can shape major national decisions without bearing the full political consequences of policy failures, as responsibility for unpopular outcomes may ultimately rest with the elected civilian government.

The civilian government, weakened by its dependence on institutional support, remains unable to act independently or attribute failures to the military establishment, even as critics argue that Munir exercises decisive influence over the political landscape. For many dissenting voices in Pakistan, the space for opposition has narrowed considerably. Some resort to armed resistance against the state, as seen with militant groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and separatist organisations such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), while the principal political challenger, Imran Khan, remains imprisoned.

Khan has used the phrase “Asim Law” to describe what he sees as governance by an individual rather than by constitutional institutions. He argues that Pakistan is moving toward a system in which military authority overrides civilian institutions. Following Munir’s elevation to Field Marshal, Khan sarcastically remarked that the title of “King” would have been more appropriate, arguing that the promotion symbolised excessive personal authority rather than merely a military distinction. The fundamental issue is not that a Field Marshal advises the government; such interaction between civilian leadership and military command is normal in any state.

The problem arises when the adviser becomes the expanded and ultimate decision-maker without corresponding constitutional accountability. History has repeatedly demonstrated that when civilian governments surrender institutional space to the military ~ whether voluntarily or under pressure ~ the consequences for democratic governance can be profound. Therefore, the involvement of a serving Field Marshal in efforts to control population growth is neither constitutionally warranted, healthy for democratic development, nor surprising within Pakistan’s broader civil-military trajectory. It is both a symptom and an indicator of a deeper institutional imbalance.

(The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), and former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)