The Quad and China
The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a grouping of four Indo-Pacific nations, US, Japan, Australia and India. Its fourth inperson Quad leaders’ summit was hosted by President Joe Biden in Wilmington, Delaware, recently.
Among the plethora of regional and inter-regional organisations with leading nations as influential members of the world’s political and economic policy-making bodies such as Nato, Quad, SCO, Asean, Brics and many others, the possible expansion of the last names by welcoming new members has generated considerable interest in global politics.
Among the plethora of regional and inter-regional organisations with leading nations as influential members of the world’s political and economic policy-making bodies such as Nato, Quad, SCO, Asean, Brics and many others, the possible expansion of the last names by welcoming new members has generated considerable interest in global politics. Some of the successful members of the Asean bloc have expressed interest and are considering joining the group. This has sparked considerable debate as there is both hope as well as fear.
Hope because any decision to welcome new members to the grouping would be a step forward to integrate more countries into the global economy. Fear and concern because this may lead to over-dependence on China. What generates interest in some members of the Asean bloc to join the organization is the desire to diversify options in order to remain engaged actively in global economic activities. Malaysia is the latest member to express interest. Sometimes internal political dynamics of the countries evincing interest to join come into play. For example, leaders in Malaysia aim to sell to their electorate that becoming a member of the Brics grouping would elevate their country’s standing in the international community. These countries wish to benefit from the collective potential of the present Brics members. This consideration lies at the core of their national interests.
Thailand submitted a formal request to join Brics in early June 2024. Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim told a Chinese news portal on 16 June that his country has made a decision to join Brics as per procedure. Interestingly, Anwar’s comments came before Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang made a three-day official visit to Malaysia from 18 to 20 June 2024. After President Xi Jinping, Li is the second most powerful leader, and was the first Chinese Prime Minister to visit Malaysia since 2015.
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What factors drive Anwar to cultivate relations with China and garner the international spotlight? It could possibly be because he is keen to manage resuscitating the stalled relationship with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which he felt suits Malaysia’s interests. Indonesia is studying the benefits it can garner from joining Brics. While Malaysia and Laos have expressed interest in joining the bloc, Vietnam is closely monitoring the process of Brics membership. As regards Singapore and the Philippines, both have yet to make their positions known.
As it transpires, the Asean bloc members are influenced by the potential for cooperation with the Brics group in terms of investment, trade and infrastructure financing, especially by India and China. These countries see India and China as potential traditional markets. As regards the background, Brics, an economic bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, India and China was established on 16 June 2006. South Africa joined the group in December 2010. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were invited to become members from 1 January 2024. Together, five of the largest developing countries in the world represent 41 per cent of the global population, 24 per cent of the global GDP and 16 per cent of global trade. The combined members’ economies are worth more than $28.5 trillion, or about 28 per cent of the global economy.
The Asean bloc members want to tap this potential. What is the procedure for Brics membership? A country is considered interested in joining the grouping when its leader or foreign minister formally communicates its interest in becoming a member state to the Brics Chair. The Chair then circulates the communication of the interested country to existing member states. An interested country becomes a prospective Brics member state when Sherpas ~ a select group of leaders representing their countries within the bloc ~ recommend it positively for consideration by Brics foreign ministers.
They in turn consider the application and make a recommendation for consideration by Brics leaders. Thus, leaders will decide on Brics membership expansion on the basis of full consultation and consensus. A prospective Brics member state becomes an invited member state when the Chair announces the consensus of leaders on countries to be invited to become full members. The Chair will inform an invited Brics member state of the decision of the grouping’s leaders and request the appointment of a Sherpa, the main channel for communication amongst the nations. An invited member state becomes a Brics member state when its leader or foreign minister formally conveys to the Chair its decision to accept the invitation for membership.
However, there are warning signals that are too risky to overlook. If the Asean countries believe that joining Brics would embolden China to play a bigger role in its trade war with the US and conflict in the South China Sea, it would be credulous to believe that such an outreach to China would ease escalation of the conflict in the Taiwan Straits. In such a situation, China could be emboldened to be more adventurous to adopt a hard-line stance towards Taiwan. That would be detrimental to regional interests. There is also an economic dimension that needs to be noted. Besides the fear of overdependence on China, it cannot be overlooked that the Chinese economy is slowing down.
There is a property crisis as well. If this slowing down process continues for the next three years or so, it will have an impact on the economic growth of countries in the Asean region. There are also other challenges. Bilateral issues such as the festering ties between India and China on boundary issues, or Saudi Arabia and Iran, could vitiate politics. Brics as an organisation would be incapable of dealing with such contentious issues. Also, not all the members of the Asean bloc are enthusiastic about Brics membership. For example, Singapore feels that even without joining Brics, it has already become an investment and financial hub for many Chinese companies and therefore Brics’ membership would be duplication of bilateral and multilateral agreements with China and other Brics countries.
The Philippines’ position is more difficult as its relationship with China over the South China Sea shows no sign of early resolution. Therefore, relationships between countries and those within the Brics bloc carry the potential of denting the relevance of Brics as well. The considerations for welcoming new members to Brics would depend on whether their expectations of real economic benefits are met. These could include investment packages, lower export barriers, an increase in the knowledge exchange between people and political leaders, certainty on loans for mega-projects and others. These are high expectations and there could be severe bottlenecks.
(The writer is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi)
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