War on terror continues

The Delhi blast is an indicator that India’s war on terror is nowhere near concluding, despite conveying strong messages to Islamabad by means of military strikes. Till the Red Fort blast, terrorism was largely restricted to Kashmir, at least in the past decade. Continuing counterterrorist operations in Kashmir have proved that terrorism can only be contained, not eradicated. However, the positive aspect is that numbers of local militants in Kashmir are receding, while overground workers providing support remain at large. These are now the target of intelligence agencies.

In addition, as the recent Delhi blast proved, radicalization is again raising its ugly head and that too across the country. Home-grown terrorism is a global concern. Intelligence agencies in western countries spend vast resources monitoring those suspected of terrorist leanings. ‘Lone wolf ’ attacks by radicalized members have been replaced by modules, capable of much greater destruction. The module busted in Andhra Pradesh, involving a doctor from Gujarat, had planned to use Ricin to poison water and temple prasad in multiple cities. This could have resulted in high casualties and increased demands for retaliation.

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The problem for intelligence agencies is compounded by the fact that some of these modules comprise educated and respected members of society, whose handlers are located abroad and their organizations funded by the hawala route. Most modules are small and their members know each other well, hence are closely knit. There were a few radicalized engineers from Kerala joining ISIS but never doctors. Communications of the module with handlers abroad are by secure apps that cannot be easily monitored. Modules are spread across the country and in many cases lie dormant unless instructed by their handlers to act.

They remain outside the radar based on their profession and standing within society. Added is the aspect that they collect material for their nefarious activities slowly, avoiding suspicion. It is not easy for security agencies to break into these modules unless a member makes a mistake. In the current case, Dr Adil Ahmad Rather was arrested for allegedly putting up posters supporting the terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed in Srinagar. It was his interrogation which provided insights on the module. Being educated, but not trained terrorists, they are not mentally strong, hence lack the ability to withstand detailed interrogation and succumb soon under pressure.

This enables security agencies to act quickly to break these modules. The arrest of Rather led to the closing in on the Faridabad module resulting in one of its members triggering the blast, aware that intelligence agencies were hot in pursuit. This is ascertained by the hurried nature of the explosion, implying that there was insufficient time for fully preparing the explosives for maximum damage. The level of coordination amongst members of the module was evident in the manner in which the car used for the blast was obtained. Coordination between different agencies and state police is what led to success. This is essential as inputs in one region indicate linkages to other parts of the country.

It is well known that these modules are managed by Pakistan’s ISI, which is the world’s only intelligence agency sponsoring terrorism in neighbouring countries. Military action, including causing high levels of degradation, has done little to deter it from continuing its nefarious activities. While intelligence agencies, working in coordination, have busted a collection of modules in recent months, an odd incident, such as the Delhi blast slipped through. This will happen, but the saving grace is that the incident was largely unplanned and casualties contained. Maximum inputs of the investigation must be shared with the public as public support is essential for locating and busting modules in the future. Blocking of hawala channels stopped stone throwing in J and K and ended the power of the Hurriyat to instigate violence and hartals.

It is now emerging as the source of funding for terrorist modules spread across the country. This source of funding needs to be investigated. It may not be fully blocked but reduction itself will render many modules inoperable. While agencies are working to counter radicalization measures, it is not easy. There are many Indian students studying in Muslim majority countries including Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey. Pakistan as an education destination is no longer permitted; however their agents operate in these countries aiming to radicalize students. Even within India, there are institutes where it happens and needs to be under observation.

Reaction by the government indicated caution. Jumping to conclusions and blaming Pakistan even before investigations are complete would not bode well globally, especially as the perpetrators were home-grown terrorists. Unless linkages are clearly established it is best to avoid blaming others. However, Pakistan’s own actions indicated fear within their military establishment as well as desperation to cover their tracks. DGISPR’s paid handles jumped into the fray trying to cover the ISI’s tracks by insisting that the blast was a ‘false flag’ operation conducted to influence elections in Bihar. On the contrary, the blast in the Islamabad court a day later, despite being claimed by the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) was blamed on India and Afghanistan.

Sadly, while terrorists or radicalized members of society have no religion, their actions tend to lower the standing of members of their community at large, who are largely viewed with suspicion. This will lead to alienation despite awareness that the numbers radicalized are just miniscule. It will only benefit groups working against the state. While terrorism in J and K recedes, incidents like Delhi are likely to occur in other parts of the country. Added are concerns of attacks on places of worship and drone strikes on security institutions to create chaos and trigger communal violence.

Security agencies need to remain on their toes to thwart them. While security agencies may block multiple attacks, one incident slipping through their fingers is enough for blame games. Finally, the nation must stand tall in the face of such incidents and stop blaming the government or intelligence agencies. Blame games only benefit the adversary and provide additional incentive to members of radicalized modules. The government, on its part, must share as many details as possible with members of the opposition as also the national public. This will enhance trust and provide inputs on suspicious activities.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)