As Pakistan’s interference in Kashmir and ceasefire violations increase, rhetoric for teaching Pakistan a lesson gain ground. Even veterans on TV discussions resort to warmongering, seemingly to enable channels to enhance TRPs.

The recent standoff at the Doklam plateau resulted in China raising the war cry. Its former Consul-General in Mumbai, Liu Youfa, stated that Indian troops could withdraw, be captured or if the dispute escalates even be killed.

The Chinese foreign office mentioned that Chinese patience may run out and the situation could escalate into open conflict. The Indian Army chief had made a statement that India has the wherewithal to fight a two and a half front war, implying an offensive war with Pakistan, a defensive war with China while controlling the militancy in Kashmir, all simultaneously. The air chief had also asked the air force to be prepared for war on two fronts. The statements by the chiefs were in no way aimed at raising the tempo.

Their statements were intended to send forth messages. Firstly, it was to forces under their command that training should be realistic and oriented towards operations. Secondly, India has the resources to enable it to engage in a conflict, if thrust upon it, despite deficiencies in equipment profile and stores.

As Clausewitz had stated, “war is a continuation of politics by other means” while Georges Clemenceau had said, “war is too serious a business to be entrusted to military men”. In a democracy, where the political leadership has complete control, resorting to war would be a political decision and the military would execute the aims set forth by the political leadership.

In a sham democracy like Pakistan, it is the army which would create conditions for war, Kargil and the Parliament attack being examples. The military in a democracy with its existing resources needs to be prepared at all times. Thus, comments by the service chiefs were appropriate. While rhetoric is acceptable, no nation would desire escalation of any situation to a war-like condition.

It is always a measure of last resort. In a nuclear environment, even localised actions, seemingly to prove a point, have the possibility of escalating into full-blown conflicts the impact of which could be devastating for the nations involved. Analysing the prevailing scenario on both our fronts would convey that while rhetoric is the order of the day, war is still miles away.

In the case of the Indo-China standoff at Doklam, any escalation from the Chinese side, warmongering notwithstanding, would involve buildup of war equipment, acclimatisation of soldiers considering the altitudes and movement of additional assets like airpower. While China may seek to keep operations localised, it would need to enhance deployment across the front to deny India an option of expanding the conflict.

This would imply Indian monitoring elements would observe increased Chinese movement and activities in the region. This has not been witnessed, hence the rhetoric for war may be a means of applying pressure. India has also not taken any step to indicate an offensive stance.

When China moved additional troops behind its soldiers deployed in the standoff, India resorted to the same. Indian troops along the Chinese border may have become more vigilant and would have increased their patrols, however these would be within their own areas and without any indication of hostility.

Thus, while India may be prepared, it has not resorted to any action signifying hostility. It has openly advocated diplomacy.

On the Pakistan front, both nations would prefer to keep army operations localised to the disputed region of J and K, while maintaining peace along the International Border. Employing air power may enhance hostility levels, and hence presently avoidable. India did have the option of expanding its operations during the Kargil conflict but it did not. It mobilised post the Parliament attack, as part of Operation Parakram; however, it did not proceed.

In both cases, India had the option but chose not to solely because a mature government at the Centre had considered the implications of war. Even in the present context, surgical strikes, artillery duels and crossborder attacks are confined to the LoC.

This would keep offensive actions restricted to a disputed region, controlling escalation of conflict. Earlier Siachen also witnessed regular firing, attacks and artillery duels, but it has become dormant after Indian domination of the area was accepted and losses made unaffordable to Pakistan.

Nations in the region possess immense destructive power, the impact of which could be devastating in human and economic costs.

War also has an impact on international standing of nations. A country seeking localisation of a conflict may have to enhance its area of operations, solely because it failed to achieve its aims in a small area. This failure can impact its international stature. It is only to save face that the Pakistan army even now refuses to share details of its casualties with its own populace. Nations seek to enhance military capabilities mainly for deterrence and to engage in war only if forced, after all other means fail.

When nations have near parity in military capabilities or are aware that they cannot cow down their opponent, then the possibility of war reduces to a stalemate, which can best be resolved by diplomacy. Nuclear strikes are the only option if operations are to be launched without warning and are highly unlikely in the present environment.

Hence, while with Pakistan India has the option to continue escalating along the LoC, with China the only logical solution is diplomacy, since the LAC is dormant.

Diplomacy would provide the best solution, so long as doors to talks remain open. War never occurs overnight, it takes time and its indicators are easily visible and can be acted upon.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army)