By calling for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has raised a bold, if controversial, proposition. The timing of his statement ~ immediately after the most serious military escalation between India and Pakistan in nearly three decades ~ only underlines how volatile the situation has become. While critics may question the feasibil – ity or diplomatic wisdom of such a demand, the core concern it addresses cannot be ignored: the credibility and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme in the context of recurring instability and provocation.

The recent clashes between the two nations once again exposed the fragility of peace in South Asia. India resp – on ded decisively to a deadly terror attack on its soil, claiming it had struck terrorist camps within Pakistan. What followed was a rapid military escalation involving airspace violations, missile threats, and heated rhetoric. In such a climate, the very existence of nuclear weapons on either side transforms a regional skirmish into a potential global catastrophe. Pakistan’s frequent allusio – ns to its nuclear doctrine, particularly its “first-use” policy, function less as a strategic deterrent and more as a reckless threat. Raising the spectre of nuclear retaliation each time India retaliates against cross-border terrorism is not just irresponsible, it’s dangerous. This is not how a responsible nuclear power behaves.

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The implied willingness to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively reflects a posture that sits uneasily with the foundational norms of international nuclear conduct. Mr Singh’s suggestion that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be monitored by the IAEA stems from this pattern of erratic behaviour. It is not an assault on sovereignty; it is a plea for accountability and international oversight in the face of repeated brinkmanship. While Pakistan bristles at any such external invol – vement, it must recognise that nuclear weapons are not merely domestic assets ~ they are international responsibilities. A lapse in command, security, or judgement can have consequences that ripple far beyond the subcontinent. To be clear, India is not without its share of military assertiveness. But unlike Pakistan, it does not routinely invoke nuclear threats in response to conventional attacks. India’s doctrine is based on credible minimum deterrence and no first use ~ principles designed to ensure that nuclear weapons remain weapons of last resort, not diplomatic bargaining chips.

The international community has long walked on eggshells around Pakistan’s nuclear posture. But continued appeasement only emboldens risk-prone behaviour. It is time to replace indulgent diplomacy with firm standards that apply equally to all nuclear-armed states, including Pakistan. The world cannot afford complacency when two nuclear powers remain locked in cycles of mistrust and conflict. If regional diplomacy fails to resolve underlying tensions, then global institutions must play a more active role in ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used as tools of intimidation. Mr Singh’s call may not materialise in practical terms, but it is a wake-up call the international community should not ignore.