Bangladesh: Whose Victory Day will it be?

Days before India marks Vijay Divas, the anniversary of the 1971 victory of joint Indian and Bangladeshi forces over Pakistan, celebrated every year on December 16, the interim government in Dhaka summoned India’s High Commissioner to convey what it described as “serious concern” over public remarks made by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina from exile.

The timing was striking. Vijay Divas commemorates not only the military triumph of the Maitreyi (Allied) armies, but also Bangladesh’s liberation after nine months of war, genocide, and occupation. That Dhaka chose this moment to escalate diplomatic signalling toward New Delhi underlined the profound reorientation underway in Bangladesh’s politics, historical memory, and external alignments.

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For the second consecutive year, Bangladesh will mark December 16 without military parades which are usually held to celebrate its independence from what was colonial rule by the Urdu-speaking western wing of the Pakistan. The absence of official commemoration by this Bengali nation is not an administrative detail but a political statement.

Since assuming power in August 2024, the interim authorities have sought to recalibrate the narrative of Bangladesh’s founding, softening references to Pakistan’s war crimes in 1971, which saw 3 million dead, hundreds of thousands raped and many more maimed for life, while redefining the country’s domestic and foreign priorities.

The war that led to Bangladesh’s independence was among the bloodiest episodes of the Cold War era. Not only were 4 per cent of the people of that nation wiped out in an unprecedented genocide, but much of the country’s intellectual elite was systematically targeted in the final days before Pakistan’s Eastern Command, led by Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, surrendered to Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini.

For decades, remembrance of that trauma, and of Pakistan’s role in it, served as a moral foundation of the Bangladeshi state. That foundation now appears increasingly shaky.

While civil society groups and sections of the intelligentsia continue to demand an unconditional apology from Pakistan before relations are normalised, the new unelected leadership has moved toward a cautious rapprochement with Islamabad.

Over the past year, multiple Pakistani military, naval, and intelligence delegations have visited Dhaka and Chittagong. Talks have reportedly explored defence cooperation and even joint production of armaments. Engagements with China and Turkey, two countries which vehemently opposed Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, have expanded in tandem.

This external realignment is mirrored by changes at home. Islamist and pro-Pakistan political forces that were discredited after 1971 are now emerging as mainstream dominant parties, albeit without any electoral tests.

The shift has triggered resistance, particularly among students and urban civil society. Earlier last week, students at Dhaka University erected what they called a “Razakar Hate Pillar,” denouncing the militias that collaborated with Pakistani forces during the war. The act reflected a broader unease among women’s groups, academics, and professionals who see the rehabilitation of Islamist politics as a direct challenge to Bangladesh’s secular and nationalist foundations.

At the same time, signs of Islamisation in public life have multiplied. Religious leaders now exercise growing influence over policy debates and calls for stricter social norms have become increasingly common.

These developments are inseparable from Bangladesh’s recent political upheaval. After independence in 1971, the country embarked on an ambitious nation-building project under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, only to descend into cycles of coups and military rule following his assassination in 1975. A return to electoral democracy in the 1990s eventually produced a duopoly between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia.

Following elections in 2008-9, Hasina presided over Bangladesh’s longest period of political continuity which saw economic growth accelerating, poverty declining sharply, and the country widely portrayed as a development success story.

That narrative collapsed in 2024 amid economic strain, currency depreciation, falling garment exports, and rising unemployment. Student protests over job quotas expanded into a broader movement demanding Hasina’s resignation. On August 5, 2024, she was finally forced to leave the country with the army’s assistance.

An interim government that took office had promised a short transition but that has now stretched to beyond 15 months. Its rule has been marked by persistent violence, vigilante justice, and the re-emergence of Islamist groups previously contained through arrests and proscriptions. Several leaders once jailed on terrorism-related charges have been released, and intelligence sources warn that they are now regrouping for another possible bout of violence and bomb attacks of the kind South Asia once experienced.

Elections are slated for February 2026, but their credibility may be doubtful. The Awami League, the country’s largest political force, has been barred from contesting. Many of its leaders are imprisoned or in exile, largely in India.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which initially benefited from Hasina’s downfall, has seen its popularity erode amid allegations of widespread extortion by its cadres. Jamaat-e-Islami, long ostracised for its wartime role, is now positioned to be a major electoral player.

A voter boycott proposed by Sheikh Hasina in one of her many speeches remains a distinct possibility. The interim leadership appears particularly wary of the Awami League’s enduring popularity among rural voters, women, and the poor.

Against this backdrop, the summoning of India’s envoy takes on added significance. By framing Sheikh Hasina and her supporters as the primary sources of unrest, and by implicitly implicating New Delhi, the new rulers of Dhaka appear to be constructing a political alibi, a fall-back option in case elections falter or be indefinitely postponed.

As India commemorates Vijay Divas, celebrating a victory that helped give birth to Bangladesh, the irony is hard to miss. More than five decades after liberation, the country’s historical consensus is fraying. The struggle now is not over territory or sovereignty, but over memory, ideology, and whether Bangladesh’s future will remain anchored to the principles that once defined its independence.