Putin’s visit unfolds as the Trump administration conducts its own negotiations with Moscow and Kyiv, seeking a path out of Europe’s most consequential war in decades.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi for a burst of strategic and commercial agreements, the view from India is clear: this is less about ceremonial diplomacy and more about hedging in an increasingly fractious global order.
For New Delhi, Russia remains valuable on three fronts. It offers insulation from tariff volatility, a dependable stream of crude that underpins India’s growth, and, most critically, a geopolitical counterweight as India navigates what it sees as the defining challenge of the century: China’s ascent.
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Putin’s visit unfolds as the Trump administration conducts its own negotiations with Moscow and Kyiv, seeking a path out of Europe’s most consequential war in decades.
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If those talks succeed and this war which has seen Ukraine devastated in an unequal but draining battle, does come to end, it is possible that the world will see a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington.
Energy is just one construct which explains India’s strategic shift. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only 2.5 per cent of India’s oil imports came from Russian suppliers. That share has since surged to around 35 per cent, driven by steep discounts made possible by Western sanctions and Russia’s exclusion from much of the European market.
This pariah status of the former Soviet empire will end if the Ukraine peace talks being held at the insistence of US President Donald Trump succeeds. That would mean India can look forward to a relationship with Russia, uninterrupted by American misgivings of the kind which manifested itself when the US administration slapped a 50 per cent tariff on India for buying Russian oil.
Also Read | Putin’s India visit schedule: Timings, meetings and events for the two-day trip
If, flowing from the peace talks, at some stage a US-India-Russia convergence of interests makes an appearance on the world, New Delhi will find itself in a rare sweet spot in global diplomacy. But that may be asking for too many stars to align.
A Russia-US détente will also mean the huge oil discounts that India enjoyed will be over.
But the relationship forged over the last 75 years will mean India will remain a vital ally and economic force on which Russia will depend as a hedge just as India looks on Moscow as a hedge against the uncertain politics of the US and the threat posed by China.
India fought the 1971 war helping liberate Bangladesh with Russian made equipment including Mig 21s. The Russian jets planes flown by Indian Air Force helped get them their first supersonic jet-on-jet kills, downing US-made F-104 Starfighters and F-86 Sabres.
A Russian submarine fleet stood guard against any foreign power intervening in the 14-day lightning war. New equipment, joint production and joint research is likely to flow from this summit meeting which will impact the way India’s defence preparedness unfolds, ensuring a space for Russia in India’s ordinance planning for decades to come.
However, Moscow today also touts a “no limits partnership” with Beijing with the same enthusiasm it reserves for its “special and privileged strategic partnership” with New Delhi. Of course this is a rhetorical duality that stands in stark contrast to Russia’s poisoned relationship with the European Union, but at the same time it is a fact that could and probably does trouble India.
Will China and, via Beijing, will Pakistan have the same technologies that Russia sells to India? That is a question troubling South Block, even though it may not wish to articulate that publicly.
Nevertheless, it has to be understood that Russia’s embrace of China is, in many ways, a reaction to what the Kremlin views as Western encroachment into Ukraine, which it considers its sphere of influence.
For Moscow, Ukraine is not simply a neighbour but a cornerstone of Russian identity and strategic depth. For much of Europe, most visibly Germany, Ukraine is a sovereign state historically oriented toward Central Europe and entitled to choose its political trajectory.
European capitals remain on edge about Russia’s intentions in the Nordic-Baltic region and Central Europe. Supporting Kyiv has become both a moral commitment and a strategic instrument: aid to Ukraine forces Russia to expend military focus in the east, reducing the chances of pressure on Europe’s own frontiers.
European assistance for Kyiv is thus not merely solidarity but containment by other means. To break that containment Russia has walked into Chinese hands. However, that may change if a peace pipe is really smoked over Ukraine. After all, Washington and New Delhi view the global “battlefield” differently. Their long-term strategic horizon lies in Asia, where China’s rise threatens to reorder the region. The question is no longer how to constrain Russia but how to avoid pushing Moscow into total dependence on Beijing. A Russia that maintains room to manoeuvre, and that can engage with the United States or India, complicates China’s strategy.
While a Russia, effectively subsumed into China’s orbit strengthens Beijing across Eurasia. Russia cannot balance China on its own. Since 2022, its economic and military reliance on Beijing has deepened. But strategic alignments are not static.
A recalibration, driven by coordinated engagement from Washington and New Delhi, or by shifts in US policy, could reshape Moscow’s incentives and see it edge out of Beijing’s orbit.
However, a Trump administration pursuing détente with Beijing tomorrow might inadvertently force Russia to broaden its partnerships and lean more heavily toward India to avoid strategic isolation.
Beneath Russia’s diplomacy lies a structural anxiety: a sparsely populated, resource-rich Siberia sits beside a far more populous and economically dominant China. Beijing’s steady expansion of economic influence and its incremental assertiveness along Russia’s Siberian border, the classic “salami-slicing” approach, underscore the risks of overdependence.
In the end, Russia’s next moves will hinge on a single calculation: whether its long-term security lies in balancing China through renewed ties with the United States and India, or in doubling down on a partnership with Beijing that offers short-term relief but long-term vulnerability.
India, for its part, seems to intend that it ensures that it is central to whatever choice Moscow makes.
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