State and Religion

Niccolo Machiavelli was an Italian Renaissance philosopher and writer. Regarded as the founder of modern political theory for separating politics from conventional morality, he notes in The Prince, “A wise ruler ought not to keep faith, when by doing so, it would be against his interest.” The core idea is that the leadership must choose power/stability over moral or religious considerations, whenever the two conflict.

Pursuing Machiavellian thoughts, many States don’t always operate in religious blocs whilst pursuing diplomacy or pure self-interest. The US-Israel-Iran war and the accompanying relations of Arab regimes with the Ayatollah-led Iranian regime typifies that divide. Even the much bandied ‘Abraham Accord’ which seeks to normalise relations of Israel with some Islamic countries counters the exclusivity of religion as the sole lever of unity or disunity. Factors like regime perpetuation, regional security interests, regional influence/leverage, commercial opportunities, or even larger geopolitical considerations can conjoin the so-called “irreconcilable”.

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Israel has pioneered the divide-and-manage tactics by pursuing selective partnerships with certain counter-intuitive states to secure its situation, within a Middle East that was already shaped by competing intra-regional rivalries. Israel pursued formal Treaties or Accords (historically with Arab countries like Egypt or Jordan) or supported informal or indirect ties with non-state or rival political actors in the region. Such opportunism evokes a mixed reaction in the region (beyond the official leadership) as the masses remain concerned about unsettled issues like Palestine.

The latest to join the bandwagon of regional intrigues is Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia, that has just announced the opening of an embassy in East Jerusalem. Israel had first driven the regional wedge when it became the first to formally recognise the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in December 2025. Incidentally, the constitution of Somaliland insists on full Shariacompliance, adherences and policies, as is the case for any hardline Arab State. However, as Israel had become the first-mover to recognise Somaliland, the Hargeisa-based regime was quick to reciprocate and signal its willingness to join the controversial ‘Abraham Accord’.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had criticised Israel’s preemptive move to “divide” Somalia. But the latest announcement to open the Somaliland Embassy in Israel has added insult to injury and led to many Islamic countries calling out the “flagrant violation of international law and relevant international resolutions.” They claim that it “represents a direct infringement on the legal and historical status of occupied Jerusalem”.

But for now, Israel and Somaliland couldn’t care less, as they are selfishly driven to make the mutual outreach. While most of the world perceives Somalia and the Somalis as a homogenous lot, the reality is that beyond co-religiousity, it is a deeply divided region with violently competing ethnicities, clans, and tribes. The image of an extremist and “failed-state” that is mired in a bloody civil war dates back to the collapse of Siad Barre’s government in 1991 after which warlordism, rise of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, and fragmentation of authority destroyed all vestiges of governance.

One of the local outcomes of the turmoil was the creation of the Isaaq clan-based Somali National Movement (SNM), that began asserting and controlling its area of dominance in the northern part of Somalia as early as 1991. Whilst still ensuring deep-rooted Islamic norms, it pursued a relatively more progressive blend of pragmatism, clan-based reconciliations, and democratic state-building goals. Despite a semblance of governance, moderation and stability (unlike the larger swathes of Somalia), regional Somaliland earned the wrath of whichever force-controlled Mogadishu (or Somalia), extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, or even competing regional forces like the militia of the rival Khaatumo clan or the neighbouring Puntland region.

While most countries and multilateral forums recognise the better organisation and operation of Somaliland, they remain wary of recognizing it as a sovereign, in order to respect the principle of territorial integrity. Basically, international law and geopolitics prioritize existing borders, regional consensus, and stability over governance performance ~ hence despite the semblance of a fully-governed authority, Somaliland was not recognised as an independent country to dissuade similar secessionist movements, until Israel stepped in. The fleet-footed and transactional outlook in Israel seized upon an opportunity to press on a topical possibility.

Tel Aviv saw the larger shifting Red Sea security threats (with Houthis across the Yemeni mainland on the other side of the Red Sea), strategic competition in the Horn of Africa amongst extremist forces, and the diplomatic and economic desperation of the Somaliland regime. In return, the Somaliland government saw the reciprocal returns of sovereign legitimacy, security, geopolitical and economic support from the Israelis. A win-win of sorts, if both Israel and Somaliland could put aside the naturalness of conflict that could be expected from any hardline Islamic country like Somaliland and Israel. Such a move would have the covert approval of the United States of America given the strategic positioning of Somaliland (overlooking the opening of the Red Sea, especially as the US navigates issues in the Straits of Hormuz, in the Persian Gulf).

The US can ill afford compromise of yet another maritime chokepoint and would rather have the whispered Israeli base (or infrastructure of some sort) in Somaliland rather than have the likes of Yemeni Houthis, Al-Shabaab, or even the expansionist Chinese (who have a base in neighbouring Djibouti) control the region. Somaliland not only exposes the limitation of religion as a basis of nationhood. It actually shows the power of economic desperation, aspiration and recognition (for the Somaliland regime), and the power of economic-military investments along with some tactical compromises (e.g. Somaliland is a Sharia-run country) in order to fructify larger benefits.

Israel had to overlook its constitutional position as a puritanical power. Now, the preachy concerns of Ummah powers like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait or even Pakistan, seem rather rich and contradictory, as they too have will-nilly supported the US-Israeli cause against a co-religious Iran, by pursuing the ‘Abraham Accords’ and by effectively forsaking the Palestinian cause. If anything, opportunism has been birthed by most Ummah major powers, and Somaliland is only the natural consequence of that sensibility.

(The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), and former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)