Rehman will need to walk a tightrope

When Tarique Rahman took oath as Bangladesh’s newly elected prime minister, the swearing-in ceremony projected a sense of political closure. Years of turbulence under the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus had left the country weary. Voters appeared to be seeking not ideological transformation, but restoration of economic stability, institutional normalcy, and social calm that the Yunus administration had promise d b ut ende d up destroying. Yet Rahman’s return to executive authority marks the beginning of a far more complex chapter.

He inherits an economy under strain, institutions that have lost public trust, and a political opposition that, though electorally weakened, retains formidable capacity for mobilization. At the centre of this uncertainty lies his government’s delicate relationship with the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and the controversial “July Agreement” – a political compact forged during last year’s unrest that may now become the fault line of his tenure. Bangladesh’s economic narrative over the past decade had been one of cautious optimism. Under the Hasina government garment exports surged, remittances flowed steadily, and GDP growth rates placed the country among South Asia’s stronger performers. That trajectory faltered during the political uncertainty of the interim period under the Yunus administration. Foreign exchange reserves declined amid currency volatility and rising import costs. Inflation began squeezing urban and rural households alike, undermining purchasing power and fuelling public frustration.

Advertisement

The garment sector, long the backbone of the economy, struggled with labour unrest and declining external demand. Investor confidence weakened as policy continuity appeared uncertain and administrative decisions became reactive rather than strategic. Rahman must now stabilize macroeconomic fundamentals while rebuilding investor trust. Fiscal discipline, currency management, and renewed engagement with multilateral lenders will be crucial. But economic stabilization cannot succeed in isolation. Markets respond not only to numbers, but to political predictability. And predictability remains elusive. The interim government period has left deep institutional scars. Bureaucratic decision-making slowed as civil servants sought to avoid political entanglement.

Accusations of selective enforcement and politicized investigations eroded trust in law enforcement agencies. The judiciary, too, became entangled in high-profile political disputes, with rulings scrutinized for perceived bias. Public confidence in neutral arbitration weakened. The civil administration, traditionally Bangladesh’s stabilizing force, emerged cautious and fragmented. Rahman’s challenge is to restore institutional credibility without appearing to weaponize reform for partisan gain. A sweeping purge could be interpreted as revenge. A cautious approach, however, risks perpetuating dysfunction. The balance between reform and restraint will define the tone of his early months. Beyond economics and governance lies a deeper social anxiety.

Increased communal violence against the minorities since the Yunus administration took over have unsettled Bangladesh’s secular constitutional framework. While the country’s identity has historically blended religious devotion with constitutional secularism, recent periods of political uncertainty left behind a deep sectarian fracture. Minority communities have expressed concern over targeted violence, and have accused the state of selective responsiveness. Rahman must reaffirm constitutional protections without alienating religious constituencies whose political influence remains significant. This requires careful calibration by asserting secular governance while acknowledging religious sentiment in a way that prevents polarization from deepening.

Although Jamaat did not secure dominant parliamentar y representation, its defeat at the ballot box does not equate to marginalization. Its organizational infrastructure particularly its student and grassroots wings remain intact and capable of rapid stre e t mobilization. In Bangladesh’s political culture, electoral loss often precedes, rather than prevents, street activism. Rahman faces a strategic dilemma. Engaging Jamaat through political dialogue could reduce immediate confrontation but risks alienating secular allies and international partners wary of Islamist influence. Ignoring or sidelining the party could provoke a return to agitation politics.

Direct confrontation may strengthen Jamaat’s narrative of victimhood. The July Agreement emerged during the height of nationwide protests last year, when political paralysis threatened to spiral into sustained instability. Under intense domestic and international pressure, major political stakeholders, including Islamist factions, reached a provisional understanding designed to de-escalate tensions. The agreement reportedly included commitments to electoral reforms, the release or review of cases against political detainees, assurances regarding political participation rights, and limitations on the use of force during demonstrations. It was less a detailed legal framework than a political ceasefire, a mechanism seen to cool the streets and facilitate elections. For Jamaat, the agreement became a strategic instrument.

It legitimized their participation in the electoral process while preserving leverage. By framing themselves as co-signatories to a national stability pact, they positioned any perceived deviation as a betrayal of consensus. Now that Rahman leads a new government, the July Agreement poses a test. If his administration seeks to reinterpret its clauses, particularly regarding protest permissions, detainee amnesties, or the scope of political reforms, Jamaat could argue that the government is reneging on its commitments. Conversely, strict adherence may constrain Rahman’s ability to assert authority or pursue accountability measures. The agreement’s ambiguity is its danger. Its lack of precise legal codification allows competing interpretations.

In moments of political tension, that ambiguity can quickly transform into confrontation. Bangladesh’s political rhythms often align with religious gatherings. Post-Eid periods have historically provided both symbolic momentum and logistical opportunity for mass mobilization. Should negotiations over the July Agreement deteriorate, Jamaat could use p o st-Eid congregations as a launchpad for renewed agitation. A return to street-centred politics would place Rahman in a precarious position.

A forceful crackdown risks international criticism and domestic backlash while permissiveness could encourage escalating demands. Each protest cycle would not merely test public order but would also strain the investor confidence and diplomatic credibility. Rahman’s mandate reads more for stabilization and not sweeping dominance. The electorate has delivered an overwhelming majority that would allow him unrestrained political manoeuvring. But his legitimacy rests on performance, economic revival, institutional repair, and social calm. The interplay between governance and street politics will define the coming months.

The July Agreement stands as both shield and sword in that contest. If managed deftly, it could remain a transitional artifact of crisis politics. If mishandled, it may become the trigger for renewed confrontation. Bangladesh’s recent history demonstrates that power is rarely secured solely within parliament. It is contested in courts, markets, mosques, and streets. For Tarique Rahman, the challenge is not simply to govern but it is to prevent his governance from becoming hostage to perpetual mobilization. Whether he can transform his electoral victory into durable national stability will determine if Bangladesh enters a period of consolidation or returns to the familiar cycle where agreements unravel, protests reignite, and political equilibrium remains perpetually out of reach.

(The writer is an independent journalist and columnist. He can be reached at raja.muneeb@gmail.com)