The Chinese leadership is nothing if not pragmatic. While speculation mounts about the role they will play in Afghanistan to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the USA, veteran Chinawatchers are clear that Beijing will remain untouched by any optimism about its capacity to transform Afghanistan unlike the West which has tried – and failed – to do so over two centuries.

The Communist Party of China, after all, is no CPSU which had ambitions of turning Afghanistan into a model of its socialist form of governance when the Soviets invaded in 1979. Beijing is focussed exclusively on its own interests in Afghanistan – primarily security concerns and, if these are assuaged, the corollary of economic engagement. But security first.

China is deeply worried about the spread of instability from Afghanistan and is especially wary of the havoc which could be caused by any popularisation of the Taliban’s brand of militant Islam among its large Muslim population in Xinjiang and across Central Asia.

To that extent, Chinese leaders have not been particularly enthusiastic about the Taliban taking over Afghanistan but, as a Brookings article puts it, “they will not allow principle to stand in the way of pragmatism, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s hosting of Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Tianjin a few weeks signalled”.

It’s almost a certainty that Beijing will be among the first countries to recognise the Taliban government of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ and in return will insist on steps being taken by the dispensation to ensure China’s security is not compromised. Denying safe haven to Uyghur radicals and other Islamic militant groups who have the potential to harm Chinese interests is likely to be a key ask.

There is much talk of China’s ambition to benefit from Afghanistan’s rich mineral deposits and incorporate the country into its Belt and Road Initiative. And it certainly cannot be ignored that Afghanistan has vast mineral deposits including copper, coal, iron ore, lithium, uranium, oil, and gas which China needs to continue growing its economy at a rapid pace as well as for its energy security.

But Chinese companies will not be rushing into Afghanistan just yet despite their penchant for risk-taking. For, Beijing has understood that even modest expectations in Afghanistan must be toned down as its lack of urgency in developing its investment in the Mes Aynak copper mine near Kabul has shown. The guiding principle for a patient China is that a return on investment can wait till the Taliban meets its security requirements, if not fully than at least substantially.

The Chinese establishment has another card up its sleeve to ensure the crisis in Afghanistan doesn’t threaten its security and, subsequently, the situation stabilises to a point where incremental steps to integrate the country into its supply chain may be taken and that is Pakistan. Islamabad will be expected to do Beijing’s bidding in Afghanistan and the former is unlikely to complain too much given its economic dependence as well as its desire to gain strategic depth vis-à-vis both India and Iran.