‘No pretences in White House’

As the global order undergoes profound churn, few voices bring the depth of experience and strategic calm of George Yong-Boon Yeo, former foreign minister of Singapore and one of Asia’s most respected geopolitical thinkers. George Yeo has long observed the shifting balance of power from both inside government and the international arena.

In this wide-ranging interview with Jayanta Roy Chowdhury and Arti Bali, he reflects on a world unsettled by what many describe as the “Trumpian shock” – the disruptive legacy of transactional politics, strategic unpredictability and recalibrated alliances that continue to ripple across continents. With special emphasis on Asia, he examines how major powers are adjusting to a more multipolar reality, the evolving dynamics between the United States, China and India, and the strategic choices facing smaller states. Drawing on his ministerial experience and current global advisory roles, Yeo, who was in Delhi to deliver the prestigious CD Deshmukh Lecture at the India International Centre, offers anuanced , unsentimental reading of a world in transition.

Advertisement

Q : How is the Trump administration’s shifting stance on NATO, Ukraine, and Greenland reshaping Europe’s strategic calculations and the future of the transatlantic alliance?

A: Trump is accelerating a shift toward a multipolar world. By calling the Ukraine war “not America’s war,” showing ambiguity over NATO, and discussing taking Greenland, he shocked European allies and exposed cracks in the transatlantic alliance. Europe is now forced to consider its own strategic future, including managing relations with Russia and defining priorities, independent of Washington.

Q : As China expands its military and economic footprint from Asia to the Indian Ocean and Africa, how should Europe balance its interests between the United States, China, and its own regional priorities?

A: Europe’s interests are increasingly independent of the US, especially regarding China, the Middle East, and Africa. Europe must engage China as a power with overlapping and competing interests, such as shared incentives for African stability. Trump’s approach accelerates a multipolar world where Europe, India, and China pursue strategic autonomy. India’s dealings with the U.S. highlight the limits of alliances, showing that cooperation, competition, and restraint now coexist, and no single power can dictate outcomes.

Q: How do you assess the long – term prospect of China-India relations, given periodic border tensions and domestic media pressures?

A: This is deeply rooted in the Chinese psyche. Despite occasional media hype in India, there is a long history of contact between the two civilizations. Xi Jinping and Modi met many times before taking office and have never spoken ill of each other, aiming to preserve their relationship. This stabilization is likely to continue, shaping peace and development in Asia for decades.

Q: How do recent U.S. actions in Venezuela reflect Trump’s broader approach to international law, sovereignty, and global order?

A: There are no pretences in the White House today. Trump, Rubio, and others openly talk about strength and power. Trump has said he will not be limited by international agreements, only by his own morality, and that he will move forward until he meets countervailing force. He has met such force in Russia, China, and India, but in the U.S. hemisphere, he is wielding a stick. He has revived the Monroe Doctrine in practice – pressuring Venezuela, reclaiming influence over the Panama Canal, making demands on Greenland and even Canada, and threatening Cuba and Nicaragua. These moves signal that this is “my hemisphere, you stay out.” At the same time, he tells Europe that their problems are their own.

Q: How do you see the military buzz around the straits of Taiwan where the Chinese have been carrying out exercises playing out?

A: On Taiwan, he (Trump) has suggested it would be Xi Jinping’s decision and he would be very unhappy if something were to happen, implying U.S. security guarantees are conditional. This forces allies, from Europe to Taiwan, to recalculate, while signalling to China that the world may be divided into spheres of influence.

Q: Does China see itself as a hegemon dominating a sphere of influence, and how might it view irreversible US foreign policy moves?

A: China does not see itself as a hegemon dominating a sphere of influence and even rejects the term G2 because it implies China is a second hegemon. Historically, China has built walls around itself to keep others out rather than to project power outward, which is why engagement with China often feels like running into walls of various kinds, including physical, financial, cultural, and even biological during Covid with the Great Biological Wall. China will read Trump’s actions as his way of playing the global game and will ask what happens after him. Even if a future Democratic president tries to reverse course, there is a ratcheting effect: some moves – like actions in Venezuela or telling Europeans “this is your problem” – are irreversible, and allies may not fully trust any reversal.

Q: What strategic lesson does this environment hold for India?

A: For India, the conclusion is inescapable: look after yourself, look after your own region, and keep all options open. Do not make unnecessary enemies. Concentrate on economic development, because economic strength ultimately speaks louder than military force. Over time, economic muscle allows India to be influential in a soft and durable way. Q: What are the implications of a possible US intervention in Iran? A: An intervention in Iran would not be simple. Iran is an ancient civilization with a deep sense of identity that will reassert itself. Even if unrest leads to regime change, imposing an alternative, such as the Shah’s son – would not last. The unrest has roots in economic mismanagement, but it is also shaped by external involvement. The likely outcome is not stability, but prolonged instability, as seen in Iraq and Libya.

Q: How should India view ongoing instability and change in South Asia?

A: South Asia is still adjusting to partition and the slow development of a Westphalian system. These divisions are artificial and recent, and there are no short-term solutions. India’s best strategy is to manage conflicts, keep temperatures low, and allow time and history to shape more stable relationships. The flames cannot be extinguished, but they can be controlled.

Q : How does Singapore manage US-China rivalry while protecting its own critical supply lines?

A: Singapore accepts the world as it is. It cannot change U.S.-China relations and should not interfere in the affairs of others. Instead, it reads trends carefully, keeps friendships with all sides, acts as a peacemaker, and stays useful to others. By serving others without ideological judgment, Singapore protects its interests as a trade and economic hub.