‘Sindoor marked a new normal’

As India marks one year of Operation Sindoor, its strategic, operational, and psychological impact continues to shape the country’s security doctrine. In an exclusive conversation with Parwinder Sandhu, Air Marshal Awadhesh Kumar Bharti. SYSM, AVSM, VM, Deputy Chief of Air Staff and former Director General of Air Operations, explains how the mission redefined deterrence and reinforced jointness.

Q: As India marks one year of Operation Sindoor, how do you assess its long-term strategic impact on India’s security calculus?

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A: Operation Sindoor has given the country a new normal. It is no longer acceptable for anyone to harbour or support terrorism and expect no consequences. Any such act will invite a response, and the perpetrators will have to pay for it. Another important aspect that has come to the fore is the relevance of air power. When I say air power, I mean the entire domain, not just the Air Force. Its importance has been reaffirmed because of its ability to react the fastest, reach the furthest, and deliver significant ordnance. This also brings us back to the basics of warfighting, which we sometimes forget. The first principle is the selection and maintenance of aim. Once that is clear, victory follows through offensive action. In many contemporary conflicts, we see shifting goalposts, which leads to adverse outcomes. Nations forced into conflict must also have a clear conflict termination strategy, something often missing today. Otherwise, it is like starting a fire without knowing how to control it. Continuous assessment during operations is also critical because things rarely unfold exactly as planned. Re-assessing on the fly is essential. That, in essence, is the impact of Operation Sindoor.

Q: You spoke about exit strategy being important during conflicts. What was India’s exit strategy during Operation Sindoor?

A: It was about taking action against terror and terror infrastructure. We struck the targets we had identified and clearly stated that we were not interested in escalation. We were not targeting military or civilian infrastructure, only terror-related assets. So, the exit strategy was built in from the beginning: respond to the provocation and avoid escalation. However, the other side chose to escalate. While we anticipated such possibilities and were prepared, we still adhered to our strategy. Even when they targeted our military and civilian infrastructure, we maintained clarity in our approach. Nothing was ad hoc. There were clear phases in targeting and operations, all executed methodically.

Q: In hindsight, what aspect of the operation do you believe has had the most enduring impact; military, political, or psychological?

A: It would be incorrect to isolate the impact to just one domain, because the operation was conceived and executed as a whole-of-nation approach. The most visible impact is undoubtedly in the military domain. Actions such as precision strikes, deployment of aircraft, and missiles are tangible and easily understood indicators of capability and intent. These demonstrated India’s operational reach, preparedness, and ability to respond swiftly and effectively. Politically, the operation clearly signalled a firm national resolve, that acts of terror will not go unanswered and will carry consequences. Once such a political will is demonstrated and recognised, it alters the strategic environment. The psychological impact is also profound. It is no longer the case that responses are confined to areas around the Line of Control or limited to isolated terrorist camps. The operation demonstrated the capability and intent to strike at the very centre of gravity of terrorism. In effect, the message is unambiguous: you cannot start a fire here and then remain untouched elsewhere. You cannot hide. We see you everywhere.

Q: What were the key inflection points in its planning and execution?

A: In military planning, identifying precise inflection points can be challenging because these are moments or decisions where any misstep could lead to adverse consequences. However, in the case of Operation Sindoor, one must understand that it was not merely about delivering ordnance; it was fundamentally about delivering a strategic message. That message, that acts of terror will invite consequences, was conveyed clearly and decisively. Another critical inflection point was the selection of targets. This was an area of extensive deliberation. The focus was specifically on terror hubs, locations that served as headquarters, training centres, and bases where cadres were housed and from where terrorist activities were planned and executed. The objective was clear: to strike at the roots of terrorism. These were not random or symbolic targets, but carefully identified nodes of terror infrastructure. At the same time, equal emphasis was placed on ensuring minimal or no collateral damage, reflecting both operational precision and strategic restraint. Escalation control was another important inflection point. The focus remained strictly on terror and terror infrastructure, avoiding engagement with military or civilian targets of the adversary.

Q: Was the adversary anticipating India’s response in the manner Op Sindoor unfolded?

A: I would not say that the adversary was anticipating India’s response in the precise manner in which Operation Sindoor unfolded. At a broad level, yes, there was an expectation that some form of response would follow. The crucial gap lay in the uncertainty surrounding the nature, timing, and domain of the action. As has been articulated, “But in what form, we do not know… where will the bullet come from, they did not know. Whether from air, from ground or from sea.” This ambiguity significantly constrained their ability to prepare effectively.

Q: How critical was jointness among the three services? Did it accelerate integrated theatre command thinking?

A: Jointness is not a new concept in the Indian context. If you look back, even in the 1971 war, the Meghna river crossing stands out as a classic example of jointness, where the Army and Air Force worked in close coordination. Similarly, during the Kargil conflict, the Army and Air Force came together effectively to deliver results. However, what has changed today is the scale and necessity of jointness. We are no longer in an era where services can operate in silos. Every domain, land, air, sea, cyber, and space, interacts with and influences the others. This integration is not limited to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but extends to other forces such as the Coast Guard and BSF, and even beyond the military to a broader national effort. Operation Sindoor reinforced this “wholeof-nation” approach. The jointness was driven at the highest level by the three Service Chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff, with a clear directive that the operation must be conceived and executed jointly, ensuring optimal utilisation of capabilities and avoiding duplication of effort.

Q : During Operation Sindoor, did Pakistan gain any temporary advantage in shaping international perception through its information campaign?

A: In the military domain, the noise generated by Pakistan had no impact on operations. We had complete situational clarity; we knew exactly what was happening and who was responsible for what. As a result, misinformation or propaganda had no bearing on operational decision-making or execution. In the fog of war, a certain amount of confusion and competing narratives is inevitable. There was a considerable volume of misinformation, including false narratives propagated by sections of Pakistani media. These were subsequently addressed and corrected through official channels.