Warfare today is witnessing a massive change. But when we analyse some ongoing wars, it is hard to decipher what is changing, and what is not. In this age of media-hype, every new idea or technology is touted as a game-changer, leaving little room for honest understanding on the future of warfare. Understanding where warfare is headed can help political leaders, defence policy makers and military practitioners to make informed decisions, and take control of their strategic choices.
Three aspects of recognising change are important. First, recognising those changes that are transactional or incremental in nature. For example, India buying additional fighter jets to supplement its air warfare capabilities. Or, buying tanks, guns and warships. These are useful increments, but nothing spectacular in terms of altering the balance of power. They simply enhance operational efficiency. The capacity might improve, but not the broader concept to fight the adversary. Newsmakers and analysts tend to obsess over such transactional changes as it produces a constant flow of news-worthy content and hype. They fail to ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ each change can, or cannot, cause a fundamental shift in India’s overall war-fighting capacity. Notwithstanding this, the incremental change is necessary to maintain status quo, particularly against China and Pakistan, and to affect more profound changes within the three Services, envisaged at the systemic level.
Second, identifying those changes that have the potential to re-shape the force. They are systemic in nature. They are both doctrinal and structural, and invariably driven by changes in technology, unlike those incremental changes these are omewhat different. Here, while the wider system remains the same, the balance between these factors undergoes a change. They typically show up as doctrinal or technological preferences, to define new concepts, structures and tactics on the battlefield. For instance, India’s quest for theatre-isation of its armed forces has the potential to produce a systemic change, but only if it is grounded in an inspiring joint doctrine and right choice of technologies. That the Air Force wants to stick to the status quo is a different matter.
In that context, systemic changes are easy to conceive or pronounce, but these are difficult to operationalize, as most militaries are inherently resistant to change. Essentially, the inter-Service tussle boils down to who gets to define the system. Third, it is about finding those transformative ideas, concepts and technologies that have the potential to re-write the rules of warfare. This is the deepest form of reform. The entire eco-system changes, not just the technology and its usage, but the rules of warfare, doctrines and structures.
For instance, the introduction of tanks, aircraft and submarines during the World Wars changed the character of war. They replaced the centrality of single-service battles with the concept of combined arms operations. The introduction of missiles added a new dimension to warfare with regard to the vulnerability of hinterland infrastructure, installations and industry. Today, drones, missiles, munitions, and battlefield digitisation are ushering in yet another transformative change in how militaries might fight future wars. Besides, Artificial Intelligence is rewriting the rules of warfare and role of human agency in war. Every military is built on a set of comfortable beliefs and it relies on the idea that specific rules, prosperity, and institutions will persist. India’s armed forces are no different.
Therefore, it needs to look at its institutions, capabilities and structures rather dispassionately, and decide on what is to be retained, and what is not relevant. It would mean discounting some capabilities that are losing purpose and legitimacy on the battlefield, like tanks, ships and aircraft. It would also imply reshaping its organisational structures that contribute very little on the battlefield, and are less agile or elephantine in size and proportion. It would even entail investing in a mix of ideas and technologies, not by merely picking anything that is absolutely new or discarding anything that is old but by identifying significant opportunities that lie in the gap between the dying beliefs and the new consensus that has yet to emerge within the military.
In any expansive change, the winners are those entities that are able to balance the old and the (disruptive) new. So how would this happen: possibly in two ways ~ by slowly hedging against conventional military wisdom, and placing small yet definitive bets on the new rules of warfare, in terms of new doctrines, structure and technology. Such transformative change is the long game that certain organisations are good at playing; it may not necessarily be the military. But then agile militaries know how to develop the resources, technology and structures at a scale, that are not reversible. Once you identify an idea or technology that fundamentally alters the logic of military power, like the Ukrainians, you know that one is looking at transformative change.
For India, this change will happen when it sheds its deep service loyalties to collectively shape and align its joint war-fighting doctrines, structures and technology. Here are some reasons which challenge India’s quest for change. India’s past wars have largely been land-centric. Our past conflicts with China and Pakistan have all been about territory, notwithstanding the contribution of the air force and the navy. Our other smaller wars too have been about territory or disaffected border regions. This centrality of land strategy in India’s territorial security and internal stability perpetuated single service thinking. However, the Balakot and Sindoor strikes denote a systemic shift in strategy. They were about precise use of force ~ air-to-air, or air-to-ground.
Drones, missiles and guided munitions have been the principal instruments in these retaliatory strikes. Land strikes, if any, have been short on scale and scope. This highlights the importance of technology that can enable prompt and precise retaliatory action by land, air and sea, to shape Pakistan’s behaviour. While Pakistan is no less important, China is rapidly gaining relative advantage in these capacities vis-a-viz India. The growth in Chinese capability highlights the need for urgent and transformative changes in India’s military capacity. Therefore, India needs to figure out its winning doctrines, capabilities and structures.
But when a military finds comfort in dated institutions is when change looks difficult. Any systemic change involves reorganising for the future, of what the military needs, what is politically acceptable, and what is financially feasible. It requires a rather dogged approach to large-scale military transformation, akin to what the Chinese have demonstrated. Or, how the Ukrainians with sheer societal will and resilience, innovativeness and adaptive-ness ~ have coped with a formidable adversary. The test of any military thinking is not whether it predicts the next war, but how well it recognizes the changes in the future of war and warfare.
We must therefore ask ourselves more complex questions: are we interested in incremental change by way of expedited military acquisitions and additions; or are we interested in a systemic change with an aim to reset the doctrine and structures; or we are looking at transformative changes to convincingly deter or defeat our adversary. Understanding this nuance might help us to see what is tactical or what is more strategic, and realise what is temporary, or what might be more permanent and durable. Until this is understood, India will remain vulnerable to new catalysts on the battlefield. In the meantime, embarking upon a comprehensive doctrinal cum force review might help resolve this impasse. A review rooted in India’s socio-economic context, guided by its regional and global concerns and sustained resourcing and industrialisation is a need of the hour.
(The writer, a retired LieutenantGeneral of the Indian Army, is a former corps commander)