The red-carpet welcome extended to Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in the Chinese port city of Dalian Monday night carried significance beyond diplomatic protocol.
China is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, and is also the largest source of development funds. Rahman is expected to tie up a number of projects and also possibly discuss the purchase of J-17 fighter jets during crucial discussions with the Chinese leadership team.
The carefully orchestrated trip ensured that Rahman’s first stop on this trip was Kuala Lumpur, followed by a conference at Dalian before moving on to more substantive talks at Beijing so as not offend New Delhi, which too has invited the Premier for a visit.
“What will be important will be the optics that the Chinese create as also the substantive matters which Premier Rahman discusses during his trip in meetings with China’s Prime Minister Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping,” Riva Ganguly Das, former Secretary-East in the Ministry of External Affairs told UNI while pointing out that Bangladesh’s Prime Minister is also expected to visit Delhi later this year.
Diplomats believe the sequence of Rahman’s diplomatic visits is not only to balance between Delhi and Beijing but to reinforce what officials describe as a “Bangladesh First” foreign policy, where Dhaka seeks diversified partnerships and avoids aligning itself exclusively with any major power.
However, beyond the symbolism, the economic and strategic concerns which prompted this trip makes it an important one.
Bangladesh is currently pursuing more than $4bn in direct Chinese funding while broader proposals worth over $9bn remain are also under consideration by Beijing-backed institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.
Among the projects under discussion with the Chinese are the long-delayed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, the expansion of Mongla Port which Indians had earlier modernised and a Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Anwara near Chattogram.
The industrial zone will include, roads, port facilities and utility networks, besides flatted factory estates. Once completed, Anwara Industrial Zone could become one of the most significant manufacturing hubs linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia.
Beijing, which has already built a naval base for Bangladesh, near Chittagong, the country’s largest port, also wants to get a toe-hold at Mongla, the second largest port as the other Chinese-built Pyara port, has proven to be a failure for hydrological challenges.
Defence analysts believe that with investments in two ports at the centre of the Bay of Bengal, China could have far more say in the region than ever in the past.
Rahman’s trip is expected to produce around a dozen agreements covering electric vehicle technology, renewable energy, banking cooperation and potentially even a currency swap arrangement.
Such measures fit neatly into China’s broader efforts to internationalise the renminbi and deepen economic integration across the developing world.
However, the most consequential development may not be economic at all. Bangladesh is believed to be finalising a $2.2bn purchase of 20 Chinese J-10CE fighter aircraft. Once completed, the acquisition would represent the largest upgrade of Bangladesh’s air force in decades and make the country only the second South Asian operator of the platform after Pakistan.
“Why Bangladesh wishes to invest in a costly fighter jet platform when it faces no military threat from any country and certainly none from us remains a mystery,” said top defence ministry officials.
However, they pointed out that with modern radar arrays every move by a J-17 or similar 4th generation jet can be tracked starting with take-off. “The purchase will nevertheless also mean deepening of cooperation on training and logistics between Bangladesh-China and Pakistan, the other user of this platform,” officials said.
Bangladesh sits adjacent to India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor — the narrow land bridge linking mainland India with its north-eastern states.
The prospect of advanced Chinese-origin combat aircraft operating near this strategically sensitive region and of close cooperation in logistics and training with Pakistan and China, both of whom have fought wars with India, inevitably raises concerns within the security establishment.
Relations between Bangladesh and India have cooled noticeably since the political transition that followed Sheikh Hasina’s departure from office in 2024. Disagreements over trade, visas, extradition issues and border management have created a degree of mistrust during the pervious Yunus regime that was largely absent during the Hasina era.
Both Bangladeshi and Indian diplomats hope that with the coming of the Tarique Rahman era, the relations between New Delhi and Dhaka will be on an upswing.
However, there is also the historical precedent of Begum Khaleda Zia’s rule when relations reached a nadir and India accused Bangladesh of exporting terror modules and allowing rebels from India’s northeast to set up camps and safe houses on its soil.
For Rahman, the challenge is therefore not simply to attract investment but to prevent economic and defence cooperation with China from becoming synonymous with “strategic alignment”.
Bangladesh’s leaders are keenly aware that their country’s prosperity depends upon maintaining productive ties with both Asian rising superpowers. China is a critical source of capital and infrastructure financing, while India remains indispensable for geography, connectivity, trade and regional stability.
The success of Rahman’s first overseas tour will ultimately be measured not by the number of memoranda signed in Beijing but by whether Dhaka can continue convincing both China and India that engagement with one does not come at the expense of the other.