India’s Act East Policy (AEP), envisioned as a strategic framework to deepen political, economic, and cultural engagement with Southeast Asia, has evolved over the past decade into a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy.
Positioned as a successor to the Look East Policy launched by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991, the Act East Policy gained renewed momentum under the Modi government in 2014.
This transition from “Look” to “Act” signified a shift from aspirational to operational—a call to implement concrete connectivity projects, forge strategic partnerships and counter China’s growing influence in the region.
For India’s geographically isolated north-east, the Act East Policy offered a long-awaited opportunity to transform from a strategic periphery into a gateway to Southeast Asia.
Connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and enhanced access to Bangladeshi ports such as Mongla and Chattogram were envisioned not only to integrate the north-east with the Indian mainland but also to establish transnational economic corridors that would link India with ASEAN nations.
The policy was thus not merely economic; it was also strategic—aimed at creating counterweights to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and asserting India’s presence in a competitive geopolitical theatre.
However, recent developments in India’s immediate neighbourhood have introduced substantial headwinds to this vision.
The deterioration of diplomatic relations with Bangladesh and the prolonged instability in Myanmar have together threatened to undermine the very foundation of the Act East framework.
In both cases, the challenge stems from domestic political transitions in these countries, compounded by the strategic opportunism of China, which has moved swiftly to fill the vacuum left by regional instability.
In Bangladesh, the fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government, which had been a steadfast ally of India for over a decade, marked a sharp turn in bilateral dynamics.
The interim government, led by Chief Advisor Md Yunus, has adopted a more nationalistic tone that at times appears overtly critical of India.
This political recalibration was reflected in Dhaka’s statement suggesting limited Indian access to the Bay of Bengal—a move that drew sharp reactions from New Delhi and culminated in India imposing import restrictions on Bangladeshi goods amounting to approximately Rs 6,400 crore.
The ripple effects of this diplomatic chill are already visible. Cross-border rail services such as the Maitree, Bandhan and Mitali Express have been suspended, the Akhaura-Agartala rail link remains unused despite completion, and the long-anticipated operationalisation of Mongla Port for Indian cargo remains in limbo.
These disruptions signify more than mere logistical setbacks; they reflect a growing strategic drift between the two neighbours.
Simultaneously, Bangladesh’s deepening engagement with China complicates India’s diplomatic calculus. China has emerged as a significant investor in Bangladesh, with projects like the China Industrial Economic Zone in Chattogram and the modernisation of Mongla Port symbolising Beijing’s long-term strategic intent.
Over the years, China’s policy of economic assistance, coupled with rising anti-India sentiment in some quarters in Bangladesh, has facilitated the evolution of Dhaka-Beijing ties into what China now terms a “strategic partnership.”
Ironically, Bangladesh’s own “Look East” policy, initially conceived to diversify foreign relations beyond India, has led it deeper into China’s strategic orbit.
The situation in Myanmar poses an even more daunting challenge. Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has spiralled into civil unrest, with the military junta struggling to maintain control in the face of resistance from pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organisations like the Arakan Army.
For India, the chaos in Myanmar has been particularly destabilising. The Kaladan project, which aims to connect Kolkata to the north-east via Sittwe Port and the Kaladan River, has stalled due to fighting in Rakhine State. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, another flagship project of the Act East Policy, remains incomplete and vulnerable to insurgent attacks.
In response to rising security concerns, India has moved to fence the 1,643-kilometre-long border with Myanmar and suspended the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which had allowed cross-border travel for tribal communities residing along the frontier.
While such measures are understandable from a security standpoint, especially in light of growing illegal arms trafficking and refugee influx, they also risk severing traditional people-to-people ties that have historically underpinned India’s soft power in the region.
China, by contrast, has shown a willingness to engage with whichever authority controls power in Myanmar, including the junta.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China continues to invest in Myanmar’s infrastructure and energy sectors, thereby maintaining its strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific.
India’s present challenge, then, is twofold. First, it must recalibrate its diplomacy to restore trust and engagement with its immediate neighbours.
This includes re-engaging with Dhaka in a manner that acknowledges Bangladesh’s growing strategic aspirations, while also pushing for stability and engagement in Myanmar. Second, India must invest in the resilience of its north-east connectivity projects so that they are less vulnerable to political shifts in neighbouring countries.
Ultimately, the success of the Act East Policy hinges not just on infrastructure or strategic rhetoric but on the stability and goodwill of India’s neighbourhood.
Without stable partnerships with Bangladesh and Myanmar, India risks not only the stalling of a bold foreign policy vision but also the strategic isolation of its north-east.
In this context, diplomacy, grounded in pragmatism and sensitivity to regional aspirations, remains India’s best tool for realigning its Act East trajectory.