India’s neighbourhood diplomacy has rarely been straightforward, but the crisis surrounding former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s conviction and death sentence has created one of New Delhi’s most complex tests in recent years. For a decade and a half, India backed Sheikh Hasina as a partner who delivered predictable governance, alignment on regional priorities and unprecedented connectivity. Her sudden fall, and the sweeping public anger that accompanied it, has overturned that comfort.
Now, India must navigate a political landscape in Dhaka that is shifting faster than at any time since Bangladesh’s democratic transition. At the heart of the dilemma is Hasina’s presence on Indian soil after being sentenced to death by a special tribunal. Extradition is politically unthinkable in Delhi, not only because she has long been viewed as a steadfast friend but also because turning her over would undermine India’s credibility with every government that relies on New Delhi’s support. Yet sheltering her indefinitely risks turning a humanitarian gesture into a diplomatic liability. Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, is already signalling a decisive reorientation ~ slowing India-backed projects, reopening conversations with Beijing and Islamabad, and seeking to project greater foreign policy autonomy. In this atmosphere, Sheikh Hasina’s continued influence from exile complicates India’s ability to rebuild trust with a political class determined to demonstrate distance. The deeper problem lies less in Sheikh Hasina’s fate and more in the asymmetry that has long defined India–Bangladesh ties.
Bangladesh depends on India for energy, transit, raw materials and even access to global markets. India, in turn, relies on Bangladesh as a buffer for border management, counterterrorism and access to its north-eastern states. This interdependence should have insulated the relationship from political turbulence. Instead, it has made India an easy target for public frustration within Bangladesh, where many believe India overplayed its hand by supporting a leader who increasingly appeared authoritarian. Yet, history shows that Bangladesh-India ties do not break simply because governments change. Economic links, cultural overlaps, and mutual security interests have survived alternations of power before, including periods led by administrations far less friendly to India. The challenge now is to prevent the Sheikh Hasina question from overshadowing everything else.
That will require Delhi to engage quietly with all stakeholders in Dhaka, avoid public signalling and resist the temptation to treat the current turbulence as a zero-sum shift towards rival powers. India’s biggest strategic misstep may not have been backing Sheikh Hasina but failing to diversify its political relationships in Bangladesh. Strong ties with one faction can never substitute for broad-based engagement, especially in a polity as fractured as Bangladesh’s. The months ahead will demand patience rather than posturing. Bangladesh will elect a new government; India will have opportunities to recalibrate. The relationship may be fragile, but it is not beyond repair ~ if both sides recognise that neighbours cannot be chosen, only managed with care.