The question remains even today: on what legal basis can the Jana Sangh or the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh conclusively be called fascist? They were accused of being anti-democratic and anti-constitutional, but these accusations were never decisively established in legal terms. Between 1977 and 1989, the rise of coalition politics transformed the direction of Indian politics.
There came a time when V. P. Singh was supported on one side by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and on the other by Jyoti Basu. It became increasingly clear that after the Congress, the BJP was the most organized political force. Even in the election where the BJP won only four seats, its vote share remained significant. Later, both its seats and influence continued to grow. There is little doubt that the BJP gained its greatest national advantage from the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. Whatever one’s interpretation of this movement, labeling it simply as fascist politics would be an oversimplification.
It may be viewed as an example of religion-based politics, but fascism is a far more complex question. If every cultural assertion is called fascist, then the same question would arise regarding the nature of the Emergency of 1975–77. The BJP steadily increased its strength through democratic processes. In 1999, a government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee was formed and successfully completed five years in office. After its defeat, the BJP also accepted the role of the opposition.
Vajpayee’s government is generally not described as fascist. Throughout this period, the issue of the Gujarat riots remained central. Serious allegations were made regarding Narendra Modi’s role. It was said that the state government had failed to uphold “raj dharma” (the duty of governance). It was also claimed that Vajpayee wanted to remove Modi, but Lal Krishna Advani protected him. Nevertheless, it is also true that after prolonged judicial and constitutional scrutiny, Modi was cleared of direct criminal responsibility. Between 2007 and 2014, Indian politics underwent a qualitative transformation.
Through the “Gujarat model,” the BJP attempted to combine development, administrative efficiency, and Hindu identity. The party expanded its organizational reach into villages, small towns, and semi-urban areas. Through the Ram Temple movement, cultural symbols, and social organizations, it strengthened its ideological base. The story of Godhra and Gujarat appeared before the public in two contrasting forms. One side portrayed Modi and Shah as criminals; the other presented them as protectors of Hindu interests. For the first time, large numbers of people felt that Hindu identity too could become part of legitimate political discourse.
The strength of the “Indian ideology” rested upon historical and intellectual memory, but in the age of liberalization and the internet, people’s experiences began to change. Public opinion was no longer shaped only by newspapers and universities. People were now understanding politics through their own experiences, media exposure, and the digital world. Hindu nationalists intervened in this new space in an organized manner. The capitalist class too has always followed the direction of political winds.
During British rule, when Congress influence grew, industrialists moved closer to Congress. When Nehru’s influence expanded, they aligned with him. For a long time, it was said that their hearts lay with Hindu nationalists while their minds remained with the “Indian ideology.” Gradually, however, a time came when both began moving in the same direction. The growing influence of Hindu nationalist organizations among the youth accelerated this change.
The sharpest criticism of the ideological rigidity of the “Indian ideology” came not from a right-wing thinker, but from leftist intellectual Perry Anderson in 2012. Yet that criticism did not receive serious attention. Gradually, it became clear that the balance of political power could change. Yet despite this, a large section of “Indian ideology” continued to rely mainly on Gandhi’s assassination, the alleged fascist character of the RSS, and accusations regarding the Gujarat riots as their principal political weapons. A large section of the public no longer found these accusations sufficient.
People could see that courts had cleared Modi and that the BJP was raising issues many citizens felt in their own lived experiences. The BJP also attempted to reshape caste equations in its favor. It projected Hindu identity as a broad political framework. As a result, in 2014 it established decisive control over the central government, and thereafter the central balance of Indian politics changed. All this happened within the democratic process. Elections were held, the people voted, and power changed hands. In a democracy, political forces continue to change.
One side wins, another loses, and circumstances evolve. But to describe every disagreement as fascism or every opponent as anti-national only makes democratic politics more extreme. The RSS and BJP do not formally reject the Indian Constitution or electoral democracy. They may indeed have many ideological and policy-related problems. The tendency to move from opposition to Muslim appeasement toward outright hostility to Muslims, attempts to increase influence over institutions, and narrowness on questions of cultural diversity ~ criticism of all these is both a democratic right and duty.
But simply declaring a party or its supporters fascist because it has enjoyed long-term public support weakens political analysis. Presenting history in such a way that one side appears entirely black and the other entirely white is no longer effective. The experience of Indian politics is far more complex. Leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Chandra Shekhar, and P. V. Narasimha Rao engaged in ideological struggles, yet maintained dialogue on national questions. Vajpayee could be sent to international forums to present India’s position on Kashmir because political disagreement had not yet been transformed into national hostility.
The greatest need in politics today is to preserve this culture of dialogue. Democracy is not merely a system for winning elections; it is also a culture of coexistence with opposing ideas. If every ideological rival is branded anti-national, fascist, or communal, the foundations of democratic society will weaken. A diverse society like India survives not through permanent consensus, but through maintaining balance amid disagreement. That is why the different streams of Indian politics must understand that permanent polarization ultimately harms all sides. The strength of Indian democracy has always lain in its ability to absorb even ideological extremes within itself.
Differences of opinion are permanent here, yet the political process has largely prevented them from turning into violent conflict. Therefore, the need of the hour is not to transform political opposition into moral enmity. In a democracy, the people’s verdict is the ultimate basis of legitimacy, and dismissing any political current that has enjoyed long-term public support merely through slogans ultimately weakens democratic wisdom itself.
(The writer is Professor of History, Rabindra Bharati University)