The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, held in August-September 2025, has emerged as a turning point for India’s foreign policy and its complex relationship with China. At a time of seismic geopolitical shifts, the summit highlighted a reconfiguration of alignments in Asia and beyond. The Modi-Xi Jinping meeting on the sidelines carried significance far beyond protocol, symbolising the possibility of a thaw between two Asian giants that have spent years locked in suspicion, especially after the deadly Galwan clashes of 2020.
This was Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to China since Galwan, signalling a deliberate decision by both New Delhi and Beijing to recalibrate ties. Since 2020, the relationship was defined by mistrust, with disengagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) slow and fraught. Yet global realities ~ marked by U.S. unilateralism, economic coercion, and tariff weaponization under Donald Trump – ironically incentivised India and China to search for common ground. Both suffered from supply chain disruptions and punitive tariffs, prompting even adversaries to reassess their options.
Beijing, grappling with trade and technology pressures, eased some of its post-Galwan restrictions, lowering the temperature with India. Against this backdrop, the SCO Summit provided the right stage. Symbolic gestures like resuming direct flights, reopening the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and easing visas carried meaning beyond technicalities. They signalled intent to restore normalcy and people-to-people contact, badly eroded in recent years. Modi captured this sentiment when he called peace and tranquility at the border an “insurance policy” for bilateral ties ~ a reminder that disputes may persist, but stability is indispensable. The border question dominated talks.
Both sides acknowledged progress in troop disengagement in Ladakh in late 2024 and backed new border management mechanisms negotiated by their Special Representatives. They reaffirmed commitment to a fair resolution of the boundary issue. Xi Jinping urged that ties be viewed from a “strategic and long-term perspective,” while Modi stressed that the welfare of 2.8 billion people ~ their combined populations – was tied to bilateral stability. It was both an appeal to pragmatism and a reminder that rivalry cannot derail their larger global ambitions. Economic relations featured prominently.
India’s longstanding concern about its massive trade deficit was raised directly, with both leaders agreeing to explore ways to address the imbalance. Xi stated that India and China are not rivals but partners in development ~ a promise that, if realised, could reshape one of the thorniest aspects of ties. The emphasis on expanding trade and investment reflected recognition that economic cooperation can act as both stabiliser and trust-builder. For New Delhi, the challenge remains ensuring trade does not create strategic dependency, but acknowledgement of the imbalance itself was notable progress. Security issues also featured. Cross-border terrorism was highlighted, with both countries acknowledging shared experiences of extremist violence.
The joint statement explicitly condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack. For India, this was a diplomatic win: China had historically hesitated to directly criticise Pakistan-linked attacks, but its inclusion this time suggested at least limited convergence on counter-terrorism. The language was balanced, but symbolically significant. Within the SCO framework, Modi’s strong anti-terror pitch found echo in the Tianjin Declaration, which condemned attacks in both India and Pakistan.
This unusual simultaneity signalled a willingness within the SCO to move beyond the India-Pakistan blame game. For New Delhi, it was validation of its longstanding call for “zero tolerance” and rejection of double standards. India also used the SCO stage to articulate its strategic vision. Modi reiterated that connectivity projects must respect sovereignty ~ an implicit rejection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and specifically the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan- occupied Kashmir. Instead, he promoted alternatives such as Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, offering models of connectivity that respect borders while fostering integration. This balanced defence of sovereignty with constructive proposals for the region.
Parallel diplomacy also defined Tianjin. Modi met leaders from Russia, Central Asia, and beyond, underlining India’s expanding foreign policy reach. His visible camaraderie with President Putin, underscored by their symbolic car ride, reinforced shared opposition to unilateral Western sanctions ~ sanctions that have hurt India’s energy imports from Russia. With Xi and Putin united in criticising Western “bullying,” the SCO projected a non-Western front challenging the legitimacy of the Western-led order. For India, the challenge is balancing such engagement with its ties to the U.S. and Europe, but Tianjin demonstrated its ability to exercise strategic autonomy without succumbing to bloc politics.
Still, controversy was not absent. Domestically, the Congress Party accused the Modi government of legitimising Chinese territorial aggression, warning that engagement without accountability risked rewarding Beijing. In the neighbourhood, Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Oli protested India-China trade through the Lipu Lekh Pass, arguing it infringed on Nepalese sovereignty. Such reactions highlight that diplomatic breakthroughs abroad can generate political turbulence at home and in the periphery. Despite these tensions, the Tianjin Summit marked a decisive step in India’s recalibration of ties with China.
It did not resolve the border dispute, erase mistrust, or balance power asymmetries. But it showed that both sides are willing to manage differences in pursuit of broader gains. The imagery of Modi, Xi, and Putin interacting warmly conveyed a message of Asian powers shaping their own pathways in a turbulent global order. The Tianjin Declaration reinforced this. It condemned terror attacks in both India and Pakistan, criticised unilateral sanctions, opposed strikes on Iran, and endorsed multipolarity ~ all positions challenging the Western-led system. China’s announcement of billions in grants and loans to SCO members added material weight to this stance.
India, while distancing itself from the Belt and Road, carved space to assert its principles on sovereignty, development, and non-interference. Ultimately, Tianjin revealed that India-China relations, though fraught, are not predetermined by conflict. Structural and geopolitical realities can push even adversaries toward limited accommodation. For India, the task is leveraging this momentum without compromising on sovereignty. For China, the challenge is proving that its rhetoric on partnership is backed by tangible action.
The SCO Summit in Tianjin may not have solved the riddle of India-China ties, but it has opened space for cautious optimism. In a world unsettled by Western protectionism, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and terrorism’s shadow, the ability of Asia’s two giants to find common ground is a global necessity. Whether this spirit lasts will depend on careful navigation ahead, but for now, Tianjin stands as a reminder that even rivals can rediscover the logic of cooperation in an uncertain world.
(The writer is Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)