In the shifting geometry of Indo -Pacific geopolitics, maritime diplomacy has become the decisive theatre of influence. Sea lanes are no longer mere conduits of commerce; they are corridors of competition, cooperation, and contestation. Against this backdrop, Exercise MILAN 2026, the 13th edition of India’s flagship multilateral naval engagement conducted from February 15 to 25, stands as a calibrated assertion of India’s role in shaping the maritime order.
It also reflects the expanding contours of India’s MAHASAGAR vision, an evolution of its earlier SAGAR framework that seeks to position India as a central maritime power committed to inclusive security, strategic autonomy, and cooperative stability across the Indo-Pacific. Meaning “confluence” in Hindi, MILAN has evolved from a modest regional initiative into a global maritime platform. First conducted in 1995 under the Andaman and Nicobar Command, it brought together the navies of India, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. What began as a confidence-building mechanism focused on professional exchanges and limited drills has, over three decades, matured into a central pillar of India’s maritime statecraft.
The growth trajectory is instructive. By 2022, 42 countries from across the globe were participating. In 2026, that number has climbed to 72. The scale of participation signals not only institutional continuity but diplomatic credibility. MILAN is no longer a regional naval gathering; it is a convergence of maritime stakeholders invested in stability across the Indo-Pacific. A significant structural shift occurred when the exercise moved from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to Visakhapatnam under the Eastern Naval Command. This transition enabled larger force mobilization, expanded sea space for complex maneuvers, and greater logistical depth. Strategically, it marked MILAN’s evolution from a peripheral regional exercise to a central Indo-Pacific engagement capable of hosting high-intensity operational scenarios.
A defining feature of MILAN 2026 is India’s indigenisation drive. The carrier battle group, likely led by INS Vikrant, will anchor the operational component of the exercise. Destroyers, stealth frigates, and other frontline platforms built in Indian shipyards are expected to operate alongside foreign navies in complex tactical environments. The signal is deliberate and twofold. India is not merely a buyer of advanced military hardware. It is positioning itself as a builder of platforms and an operational partner capable of integrating indigenous assets into multinational frameworks. The display of domestically produced naval capability within a multilateral setting reinforces India’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and defence manufacturing leadership. MILAN 2026 unfolds at a time when the Indian Ocean Region is witnessing intensified competition.
China has expanded its naval foot print through sustained deployments, port access arrangements, dual-use infrastructure projects, and submarine patrols. Maritime spaces that were once treated as global commons are increasingly sites of geopolitical signalling. In earlier editions, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh emphasized the importance of safeguarding a fair maritime order and defending the principles of a rules-based international system. His articulation reflects shared concerns among participating states, including piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, trafficking, cyber vulnerabilities, and supply chain disruptions.
Traditional and non-traditional threats now intersect with great-power rivalry. Within this strategic environment, MILAN performs layered functions. It reinforces norms such as freedom of navigation and cooperative security. It enhances interoperability among diverse naval forces. It reassures smaller littoral states of India’s commitment to inclusive maritime stability. Simultaneously, it signals that the Indian Ocean is not a vacuum but a theatre of structured, multilateral engagement. MILAN’s design reflects India’s preference for flexible multilateralism rather than rigid alliance blocs. The exercise combines harbour interactions, professional seminars, and complex sea phases involving coordinated maneuvers and cross-deck operations. Such engagements build trust and operational familiarity without binding states into formal treaty obligations. For middle and smaller powers, this model offers strategic space.
For India, it strengthens diplomatic capital while reinforcing its role as a credible net security provider in the region. The 13th edition of MILAN encapsulates three decades of institutional maturation. The leap from 42 participating countries in 2022 to 72 in 2026 underscores expanding global interest in cooperative maritime frameworks. The prominence of indigenous platforms signals technological confidence. The operational scale demonstrates preparedness. MILAN 2026 is therefore not simply a naval exercise. It is an instrument of maritime diplomacy calibrated to an era of uncertainty. Through convergence rather than confrontation, India is shaping the evolving maritime order of the Indo-Pacific, projecting capability, building coalitions, and reinforcing norms that underpin regional stability.
(The writer is a Ph.D. Scholar at Sharda University, researching India’s maritime strategy, with professional experience in academic administration and education.)