Time is a fundamental aspect of justice. The efficiency of the justice system dep ends no t only on accurate judgments but also on how courts utilise their time. The Indian judiciary is currently confronted with a dilemma: despite apparent advancements in technology, public confidence, and constitutional authority, there are still considerable delays in the administration of justice, despite the bench and bar’s earnest efforts.
The absence of a systematic and predictable time management system during court proceedings is a crucial issue that is often disregarded, despite the fact that problems like procedural delays, mounting caseloads, and vacancies receive a lot of attention and may be resolved. What is the cost of unmanaged time? As of date, over 93,000 matters are pending before the Supreme Court of India. Despite the Court functioning at or near full strength in recent years, pendency has remained at record levels. The reason is not simply a shortage of judges; it is, in part, a shortage of discipline in how hearing time is allocated and consumed.
Any practitioner who regularly appears before the Supreme Court will recognise the problem: waiting hours for a matter to be called, only to watch a handful of cases absorb disproportionate court time through repetitive submissions and extended arguments. Such prolonged hearings carry compounding costs. They crowd out matters of genuine constitutional significance, produce verbose judgments burdened by redundant precedent, and deny access to justice to those whose cases never receive adequate attention. The right to a speedy trial in India is not a procedural luxury; it is a constitutional guarantee. The Supreme Court, in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) and Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan (2016), has itself recognised that access to justice and timely justice are inseparable dimensions of Article 21.
If the Court takes this principle seriously externally, it must equally apply it internally. There is a broader benefit to time-bound hearings that is often overlooked: they improve the quality of advocacy itself. A counsel who knows she has thirty minutes to address the bench will prepare differently and better than one operating without any time horizon. Arguments b e come sharp er, submissions more focused, and core legal issues surface faster. Brevity, as any experienced judge will confirm, is rarely the enemy of clarity. Concise oral arguments also ease the burden on the bench. Judges can engage with the heart of a legal question rather than sift through layers of repetition.
In constitutional courts especially, where legal principles have lasting societal impact, the quality of reasoning matters more than the volume of submissions. There are lessons to be drawn from other jurisdictions. The reform being proposed here is neither novel nor untested. Comparable frameworks operate in several leading common law jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, Practice Direction 6 of the Supreme Court requires parties to submit advance estimates of the time required for oral submissions, mandates that arguments remain within those estimates, and requires an agreed hearing timetable for appeals exceeding two days.
In the United States, Rule 28 of the Supreme Court Rules limits each side to thirty minutes of oral argument, with extensions rarely granted. The Supreme Courts of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand similarly fix hearing durations in advance and place heavy reliance on written submissions. Across these jurisdictions, three principles can be consistently observed. They include advanced estimation of hearing time, primacy of written advocacy, and strict adherence to allocated schedules and deadlines. The Supreme Court of India has time and again reiterated that untimed oral arguments often worsen judicial delay and has highlighted the necessity of a regulated courtroom [Ajit Mohan v. Legislative Assembly, NCT of Delhi, (2021)]; however, it presently lacks any comparable institutional framework.
While individual benches occasionally impose informal limits, there is no court-wide rule requiring realistic time estimates or structured hearing schedules. Recently, Chief Justice Surya Kant required lawyers to indicate in advance the time necessary for oral submissions, reflecting an important shift towards structured judicial case management. Although this initiative is not yet formalised, the underlying objective remains constitutionally significant: balancing full hearing with the equally compelling need for timely justice under Article 21. A compelling body of research cautions against treating judicial expansion as a standalone solution.
Studies analysing Indian court data have observed that increases in judge strength have not consistently produced proportional reductions in pendency, a phenomenon described as “induced demand,” where expanded capacity encourages additional filings without corresponding improvement in disposal. Treating the symptom without addressing procedure risks deepening the very problem it seeks to solve. The logical step forward is the institutionalisation of hearing management: pre-fixed time slots, advance time estimates filed by counsel, and a tiered approach that allows greater flexibility for complex constitutional questions while imposing firm limits on routine matters. This is not an argument for speed at the expense of fairness.
Fairness and efficiency are not in tension, but they are mutually reinforcing. A legal system that takes years to resolve a dispute is not a fair one, regardless of how correct its eventual judgment may be. Judicial time is a public resource of the highest order. The Supreme Court, which has long championed the right to timely justice for litigants, must now apply that standard to itself, not as a concession to administrative pressure, but as an act of constitutional fidelity.
The writers hold LL.M degrees from the University of Cambridge and are, respectively, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Additional Standing Counsel for NDMC, and an Advocate, Supreme Court as well as Empanelled Assisting Counsel, Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.