Xi Jinping at his meeting with Donald Trump on 14-15 May 2026 in Beijing referred to the Thucydides Trap, a metaphor that refers to the inherent tensions and perils when an established power is challenged by a rising power. This is not the first time that Xi referred to it; he used it in 2014. Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War (411 BC) observed that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”. The war began in 431 BC between Sparta, the established power, and Athens, the rising power, for hegemony in ancient Greece.
It ended in 404 BC with the defeat of Athens. In recent times Graham Allison has popularised this metaphor with wider historical examples and applies it in analysing the US-China relationship. Allison points out: “Others identified an array of contributing causes of the Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides went to the heart of the matter, focusing on the inexorable, structural stress caused by a rapid shift in the balance of power between two rivals”.
In addition, according to Allison, “two key drivers in this dynamic,” were according to Thucydides, “the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other”. The Thucydides trap continues to be a reference point comparable to Kant’s doctrine of democratic peace in international affairs. The allusion of a 2000-year plus old theory to a phenomenon in the nuclear age raises several questions. With the dawn of the nuclear age, it was generally assumed that war itself has undergone a sea change.
Instead of war and winning it, the emphasis is more in its prevention and if that fails, to limit its ambit as far as possible. This was clearly evident during the Cold War era when the conflict did not become hot in the core areas of interest of the superpowers, though wars and ideological conflicts were endemic in non-Western areas. Both superpowers willingly, openly and constantly maintained their channels of communication to avoid any unintended and accidental mishap. The hotline between Washington and Moscow never stopped. In the nuclear age, fear of MAD is the ultimate consideration.
The world that came to a brink for six days of an eyeball-to-eyeball direct confrontation between the US and the USSR during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was saved by deterrence and détente. In the 21st century, the rise of China in a world that is post-ideological is spectacular and generally acknowledged as the most important phenomenon of the millennium. China’s ascendance, Allison observes, will have an impact on the US-led international order. The late Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s former PM, China watcher and mentor to Chinese leaders since Deng Xiaoping, remarked, “the size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance.
It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the World”. China’s rise is so rapid and fast that “we have not yet had the time to be astonished”, pointed out Vaclav Havel, the former Czech President. China has vaulted into the top of the world in the course of a generation. The Chinese economy which was smaller than that of the Netherlands in 1980 had become roughly equal to it by 2014. It is at present the second largest economy and projected to overtake the US in a decade. China, unlike the US, is pragmatic and has no ideological baggage.
Emphasizing on the civilisational nature of its state, it operates on a much more universal plank of mutual benefit by trade, commerce and considerable patience. Unlike the US that intervenes in many undeclared wars, even dislodging legitimate and democratically elected leaders, China confines itself to its developmental model and its expansion through BRI and other international organizations. China along with Russia differs from the US in its attitude towards the United Nations. The US specially under the Trump administration has put the UN on the back burner.
Xi brought in the Thucydides trap in his opening remarks to mould the discussion and avoid skilfully the present-day conflicts both in West Asia and Taiwan. It was a ploy to restrict the debate between the US and China with a general acceptance of bipolarity relegating other important events to only local and limited consequence. Xi raised the question categorically – as to whether China and the US can transcend the Thucydides trap and forge a new paradigm for relations between major powers? The onus is on the reigning power, the US, and not on the challenger, China. It is not a zero-sum game as Xi underlined the fact there is enough space for both the US and China in the world to grow peacefully with competitive spirit and controlled rivalry.
As a rising power, China’s share of the cake will obviously grow larger and in a zero-sum game, that of the US would shrink which the latter would find hard to swallow. In 2025, China’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) accounted for approximately 19.89 per cent of the total global economy while that of the US was 14.65 per cent. The US remains the world’s largest economy with a nominal GDP of approximately $30.5 trillion, while China’s nominal GDP is roughly between $19.2 to $19.6 trillion. China in 2014 was ahead of the US on most economic indicators. In 2014, China was 101 per cent of America in PPP terms; 60 per cent in GDP and 106 per cent in exports.
In 1980, China’s PPP in comparison to the US was at 10 per cent, GDP at 7 per cent and its exports at 6 per cent. The American century coined by Henry Luce in 1941 is ebbing. The unipolar world that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union has ended. Xi’s reference to the Thucydides trap is a call to the US to re-adjust itself to a world where bipolarity will be the order. Putin’s rush to Beijing is to seek a guarantee that the new polarity does not shake up the close relationship between Russia and China. Xi’s indication of China’s core interests, though rhetorical and firm on Taiwan was subdued in the actual communication reflecting the limitations of the Chinese challenge to the US, emphasizing the gradualist process of development with the expectation that belligerence of the US will also be limited, dictated both by its self-interest and compulsions.
The Chinese want a continuance of the American policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan and also to underplay ideological rhetoric against China in matters like human rights, unfair trade practices and abandonment of plans for an Asian NATO. China has demonstrated its willingness to be patient and follow legally tenable measures in reclaiming both Hong Kong and Macau. It is very clear that it will not disturb the apple cart on Taiwan unless the latter declares unilateral independence which it can only do with US support. The acceptance of the one-China policy by Nixon and Kissinger which was tinkered somewhat by the Carter amendment remains the basis of China-US relationship. There is no indication that Trump is in any hurry to alter it.
Economic integration between mainland China and Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the Chinese willingness to accept plurality in Hong Kong and Macau have created many functionalist categories. Functionalism has always been a solid basis of integration. The best possible US policy towards China is a rehash of the containment theory that was effectively used against the USSR, an incomplete and one-dimensional superpower. Another important limitation of the Soviet Union was its isolationism which retarded both its growth and its inability to match the West in innovation and competition. But the Chinese leadership has learnt from the Soviet folly. China today, since its membership to the WTO in 2002, is totally integrated with the world economy. Its investment in American bonds and unmatched manufacturing base has created dependence even for the US domestically.
The spectacular success of China in maintaining its growth rate, AI and EVs have made it more competitive and essential for other countries to emulate and trade with it. The interdependence between the US and China is also phenomenal where the purchase of soybean becomes an important issue in determining the welfare of a large number of American farmers. The crux of the matter is that the American leadership beginning with Obama has shifted its policy towards the East since power and economic determinants shifted to the Asia Pacific. In light of this the US would like to check and lengthen the process rather than attempt to halt it.
(The writers are retired Professors of Political Science, University of Delhi)