The violence that erupted in Manipur on 3 May 2023 and has now completed three years as of May 2026, did not produce a simple binary confrontation between Kukis-Zomis and Meiteis. Instead, it has triggered a far deeper and more complex restructuring of ethnic relations across the state.
What has unfolded is not merely inter-community hostility, but a fragmentation of the very idea of coexistence, one that has expanded beyond the Kuki–Meitei divide to include renewed conflict between Kukis and Nagas, particularly the Liangmai and Tangkhul Nagas. The crisis today reflects not a single conflict but a layered and evolving set of confrontations shaped by historical memory, political contestation, changing power dynamics on the ground, and contested state responses.
To understand this layered hostility, it is essential to look beyond the immediate rupture of 2023 and revisit earlier intra-tribal and inter-ethnic conflicts that continue to cast long shadows over the present. The Kuki–Naga clashes of 1992–98 and the Kuki–Paite conflict of 1997–98 were not isolated episodes but formative moments that reshaped inter-community relations without resolving their underlying contradictions. Alongside these violent confrontations, there have also been enduring contestations over identity within the broader “Kuki-Zo” fold.
The majority of the Thadou community, as well as Hmar and Zomi tribes such as Vaiphei and Paite, have consistently resisted the imposition of a homogenised “Kuki” or “Kuki-Zo” nomenclature, asserting their own distinct identities. These unresolved tensions, both violent and ideological, continue to inform present alignments and mistrust, demonstrating that the current crisis is not only about inter-ethnic rivalry but also about unresolved intra-ethnic fragmentation. The past has not been reconciled; rather, it has been layered into the present.
The current crisis is therefore better understood as the convergence of long-standing fractures that have reached a critical point, further complicated by the perception that armed actors operating under formal arrangements with the state are reshaping realities in ways that destabilise inter-community relations. The immediate trigger for the 2023 violence was the controversy surrounding the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status. For Kuki-Zomi communities, this demand was perceived as a direct threat to constitutionally protected land rights in the hill areas, particularly in the context of state actions such as eviction drives in reserved and protected forests and the war on drugs campaign targeting poppy cultivation in Kuki-Zomi dominated districts. What might otherwise have remained a political dispute escalated rapidly into widespread violence, revealing how fragile the foundations of coexistence had already become.
The speed and intensity of the escalation suggested that the conflict was not spontaneous, but rather the activation of long-standing anxieties over land, identity, and political control. The events of 3 May 2023 marked a decisive rupture in Manipur’s social fabric. Meiteis were driven out of Churachandpur through targeted attacks, including the burning of homes, and similar patterns of displacement followed immediately in other Kuki-Zomi dominated areas such as Kangpokpi, adjoining regions of Imphal East, and the border town of Moreh. These actions were followed by retaliatory violence in the valley, leading to the displacement of Kuki-Zomis from Imphal. Within a matter of days, Manipur witnessed not just violence but a near-complete ethnic re-segmentation of space.
Communities that had lived in proximity for generations were suddenly separated into distinct territorial enclaves. At the core of the Kuki-Meitei conflict lies a deeper clash of territorial and political imaginaries. The Meiteis, historically the dominant political community of the Manipur kingdom, view the state as a unified and multi-ethnic entity in which the valley and hills are inseparably linked. In contrast, Kuki groups, historically referred to as Khongjai in Manipur records and increasingly articulating a “Kuki-Zo” identity, assert claims rooted in specific hill territories, often accompanied by demands for separate administrative arrangements.
The Manipur High Court’s direction to consider recommending Scheduled Tribe status for Meiteis was therefore interpreted by Kuki-Zomi communities not merely as a legal issue, but as a structural threat that could alter the balance of land ownership and political power. These tensions were further intensified by differing perceptions of state policy. Measures targeting illegal immigration, poppy cultivation, and forest encroachment were viewed by Kuki-Zomi groups as selectively directed against them, while Meiteis expressed concerns about cross-border migration and identity claims. Such sharply divergent interpretations deepened polarisation and eroded trust in state institutions. Once violence erupted, the conflict quickly assumed a militarised character.
Armed groups emerged, weapons were looted, and communities organised themselves into defensive formations. Buffer zones and blockades on national highways further entrenched divisions, restricting Meitei movement and reinforcing territorial segregation. Within this militarised landscape, the role of Kuki-Zomi militant groups operating under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Government of India and the Government of Manipur has become a central point of contention. There is a growing perception, particularly among Meiteis and Naga communities, that these groups, along with non-SoO armed Kuki-Zomi elements, have used the operational space available under the SoO framework to consolidate influence and expand territorial control during the conflict.
At the same time, Central Security Forces have been widely perceived by these communities as passive or constrained actors, often described as “Kuki supporters” during both the Kuki-Meitei conflict and the emerging Kuki-Naga clashes. This perception has significantly deepened distrust towards Central intervention mechanisms and reinforced the belief that the conflict is being managed unevenly. The roots of these tensions, however, lie in the unresolved histories of the 1990s. The Kuki-Naga conflict of 1992–98, involving intense violence driven by competing territorial claims and assertions of exclusive ethnic homelands, resulted in widespread destruction and displacement. Yet it ended without a comprehensive political settlement, leaving unresolved grievances that continue to shape perceptions today.
Similarly, the Kuki-Paite conflict of 1997-98 exposed deep fissures within the broader Kuki-Zo spectrum, revolving around issues of identity, nomenclature, and representation. These internal divisions were never fully resolved, but instead carried forward into the present. Despite this history of fragmentation, the post-2023 situation has witnessed attempts to construct a unified Kuki-Zo identity in response to perceived external threats. This consolidation is strategic, aimed at strengthening political claims and ensuring collective security, but it remains inherently fragile. The resistance of Thadou, Hmar, and Zomi groups to a homogenised identity underscores the tensions underlying this unity.
While a common front is projected in the current conflict, internal disagreements over identity and representation persist, shaping both internal dynamics and external perceptions. The renewed tensions between Kukis and Nagas must therefore be viewed as a reactivation of these historical fault lines within a newly fragmented landscape. Ethnic segregation following the Kuki– Meitei conflict has redrawn Manipur’s internal geography, creating conditions for more aggressive assertions of territorial claims. Naga groups continue to view large parts of the hill districts as integral to their homeland, while Kuki groups assert parallel claims.
In the absence of effective state mediation, these overlapping claims have led to renewed confrontation. Concerns regarding the role of armed groups operating under the SoO framework extend to Naga communities as well, who, like the Meiteis, perceive that KukiZomi groups may be leveraging the arrangement to expand influence into contested areas. The perceived inaction of Central Security Forces has contributed to a growing sense of grievance among Nagas, adding another layer of complexity to the conflict. The non-alignment of the Naga community in the Kuki–Meitei conflict has also generated ambiguity and suspicion, shaped by historical memory and present strategic calculations.
Beyond ethnicity, structural factors continue to sustain the conflict. The persistent failure of the state to function as a credible and neutral mediator has eroded institutional legitimacy, pushing communities towards self-reliance and militarisation. The proliferation of arms and the normalisation of armed mobilisation have embedded violence within the social and political fabric. Cross-border dynamics, particularly the transnational linkages of Kuki-Zomi communities across India and Myanmar, have further heightened anxieties over migration, security, and demographic change.
Perhaps the most profound transformation has been the shift from coexistence within a shared political framework to the emergence of parallel ethnic existences. Segregated territories, restricted movement, and the breakdown of economic interdependence have fundamentally altered the nature of society in Manipur. Communities are no longer negotiating coexistence, but increasingly reorganising themselves for sustained separation. The complexity of the crisis defies simplistic explanations. It is not merely a Kuki versus Meitei conflict, nor solely a tribal versus non-tribal issue.
Rather, it represents the convergence of multiple overlapping conflicts shaped by historical grievances, identity contestations, competing political projects, structural inequalities, and contested state responses. The role of the SoO framework and the perceptions surrounding the conduct of Central Security Forces add further dimensions, raising larger questions of governance, legitimacy, and the uneven exercise of authority. What distinguishes the present phase is the reconfiguration of power on the ground. Armed mobilisation, territorial consolidation, and perceived state inaction have altered how communities understand both security and sovereignty.
Trust in institutions has eroded, and the state is increasingly viewed not as a neutral arbiter but as an uneven presence within a fragmented landscape. As communities turn inward for protection, divisions become even more deeply entrenched. Manipur today is not merely experiencing a cycle of violence; it is undergoing a structural reordering of ethnic power and territorial control. The convergence of historical grievances, identity conflicts, and perceptions of state inaction has created conditions in which conflict continually sustains and reproduces itself.
Without a credible restoration of trust through impartial governance, a reassessment of frameworks such as the SoO, and a political process that acknowledges diverse identities while preserving the idea of a shared polity, the trajectory points towards deeper fragmentation. In seeking security through separation, every community risks contributing to the erosion of the very framework that once enabled coexistence. Ultimately, no community can secure a stable or dignified future within a landscape defined by permanent division.
(THE AUTHOR IS A POLITICAL ANALYST, PEACE PRACTITIONER, AND EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF THE IMPHAL REVIEW OF ARTS AND POLITICS. HE WRITES ON GOVERNANCE, CONFLICT, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN NORTHEAST INDIA.)