When telling the Unified Command in J&K to adhere to Standard Operation Procedures during the Ramzaan-Amarnath Yatra period, chief minister Mehbooba Mufti made two critical points.

First, that she shared the widespread perception in the Valley that the security forces were not adhering to those SOPs, and secondly and more importantly, that New Delhi had informally spurned the call for a “unilateral ceasefire” by over a dozen political parties in the state.

There is a strong element of the craven to the latter: the deputy chief minister in that coalition of contradictions, Kavinder Gupta, was at Mehbooba’s side when she informed the media of the consensus view, and made no attempt to contradict her.

It was only subsequently that the state BJP (possibly under directions) took a somersault, and rejected the idea of a ceasefire. Cowardly too was the union home minister declining to comment on the matter, but preferring to allow officials to shoot down the suggestion.

The political query that Mehbooba must answer is whether there is any point in continuing with the PDP-BJP arrangement (over which she initially had serious reservations) after such public humiliation: what remains of her credibility in the Valley now stands diminished after her bold attempt at reaching out to militant/separatist forces has been scuttled. Is she nothing more than a cushion between New Delhi and Srinagar?

There may be some validity to the semantic squabble over whether a ceasefire would accord undesirable equality of status to the militants: that is a trivial issue, the government could revert to “non-initiation of combat operations”, the term preferred in 2000 when Vajpayee displayed still-remembered political courage and tried to make peace.

The administrative argument against a call for a cessation of hostilities, because there was no response from the militants, is thin: there is nothing to stop the security forces from resuming legitimate operations should militant forays continue, and the suggestion that a ceasefire would loosen the grip of the forces is an admission of their scant competence, and re-raises doubts if indeed they have attained the upper hand.

The ceasefire call was a political one, a gamble perhaps, but in virtually rejecting it New Delhi has reiterated its muscular message, and indicated that its Kashmir policy (like Pakistan’s?) is dictated by the military/police ~ that may earn votes in the rest of the country but it perpetuates the chasm in the Valley.

Whether the BJP likes it or not, the folk there are our own people and using the gun on them is counter-productive ~ as confirmed by a reported instruction to the forces to try and capture militants because killings only swell their ranks.

Alas, the “grey matter” on Raisina Hill prevents lessons being learnt from the defeats of the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and ~ closer home ~the IPKF in Jaffna.