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A former minister should know better

In an article on 7 January and in subsequent tweets, P Chidambaram, the former home and finance minister, wrote that…

A former minister should know better

Kashmir

In an article on 7 January and in subsequent tweets, P Chidambaram, the former home and finance minister, wrote that the present strategy of a ‘hard stance’ adopted by the government in Kashmir will never lead to a political solution. His views were based on data indicating that terror strikes have not reduced, while the killing of terrorists and losses of security force have increased over the years.

He claimed that the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma as the interlocutor was only a political gimmick. In his view, the government’s policy of ‘no talks’ with the Hurriyat or those who demand ‘azadi’ or those arrested for stone pelting had doomed the mission to failure. He further stated that ‘no purpose will be served by pretending that there is no issue or dispute between India and Pakistan’.

He concludes by stating that while he supports the appointment of an interlocutor, it must be part of a set of measures. The measures which he suggests are promulgating governor’s rule, announcing talks with all stake holders, reducing the presence of the army and para military in the valley and strengthening the defence of the border while taking deterrent action against infiltrators and militants.

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The article appears to be more for gaining political brownie points and a few minutes of media glare than for suggesting a genuine possible solution. He should have been aware, considering that he headed critical ministries of the government, that the problem within Kashmir is neither homegrown nor internal, but has been created and fuelled by Pakistan. Pakistan has been projecting since its birth that it feels bereft without Kashmir. This is well known on both sides.

Pakistan has been seeking talks in the present environment of continued support to terror groups operating in the valley. If India agrees, then this would imply talks with Pakistan at a time when it feels it is in a position of strength. No nation, especially India, would seek to negotiate from a position of weakness. If Pakistan stops support to terror groups and moves forward for talks, then India would be the dominant party which would not satisfy Pak. Thus, talks are presently ruled out.

The Hurriyat, who Mr Chidambaram considers as major stakeholders which is contrary to the present government’s views, did possess power and support, so long as hawala funding continued to flow from across. As soon as it stopped, so did violence and strife against the state. Presently, their calls for bandhs, strikes and violence finds no takers. Mr Chidambaram ignores the fact that Hurriyat leaders purchased properties worth millions, without doing a single day’s work, using money funded by Pakistan. Thus, they played with the blood of the youth for obtaining their wealth.
Militant within the state are largely from Pakistan, with a sprinkling from within. Those from within have joined to seek local power or to overcome a jobless environment, which the Centre and the state failed to create over decades. A majority of the state’s youth desire peace and development that would provide employment avenues. This is not possible unless security forces dominate the valley and eliminate militants.

Militancy and attacks on security forces would continue so long as the Pakistani deep state is able to easily obtain cannon-fodder militants, launch them across by befooling them that they are serving the interests of Islam. They can be controlled, restricted and eliminated but never stopped. Thus, security forces would suffer casualties, despite all precautions and firepower. This must be accepted as the forces are battling state-sponsored terrorism, not simple violence. Hence reducing the presence of security forces in the valley would be detrimental to national security. The desperation within the Pakistani establishment on the success of our security forces was evident when it pushed for the release of Hafiz Saeed from prison.

Mr Chidambaram has suggested strengthening of the border and adopting deterrent action against infiltrators and militants. The culling of militants had touched a high of over two hundred in 2017, as per data in his own article. The number of infiltrators eliminated, and infiltration bids foiled have also been high last year. As a home minister he would have been aware that border management despite every known gadget is never a zero-sum game. There are rivulets, jungles and ravines which make monitoring every inch difficult. Yet, multiple layers adopted by the security forces have reduced infiltration to low levels.

His recommendation to promulgate Governor’s rule is a most absurd suggestion coming from a former home minister. Imposition of Governor’s rule, especially in J and K, sends very wrong signals across the globe. Firstly, it implies that the state has lost control over the valley. Secondly, the Governor is seen to employ the army to subdue the state, thus leading to propaganda that Kashmir is army controlled.

Thirdly, Pakistan’s propaganda machinery would have a field day projecting victory for the people of the valley as the Indian government had failed. It is for this reason that even during the violent summer of 2016, the Centre refused to consider a demand for Governor’s rule, despite calls from many quarters.

Mr Chidambaram should know the interlocutor has been given full freedom to interact with any member of society. There is no rule of not taking to the Hurriyat, those seeking ‘Azadi’ and stone throwers. In fact, many of these groups including students, who led the 2016 violence have interacted with him and would continue to do so. Interactions must necessarily be within the framework of the Indian constitution.

Kashmir needs a strong security presence to thwart Pakistan’s designs while opening doors for dialogue employing the interlocutor. It remains an issue because Pakistan holds Indian territory because the government under Nehru panicked and went to the UN, rather than trust the Indian Army to do the job. Let those in power today attempt to solve what the UPA could not for ten years, despite appointing three interlocutors and holding a collection of conferences.

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