The two headlines of September 28, 2025—‘Indian Army kills 2 terrorists, foils infiltration attempt at Keren Sector in Kupwara on the Line of Control (LoC)’ and ‘Suspected drone movement near IB in J&K’s Samba, reportedly seen hovering over village Karalian in Ramgarh sector early morning before vanishing’—are not uncommon; such incidents continue to occur with disturbing frequency.”
J&K has a 740-km-long LoC guarded by the Army and a 240-km-long International Border guarded by the BSF. Infiltration across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir has been at the core of the proxy conflict between India and Pakistan. Despite India’s formidable counter-infiltration/counter-terrorism (CI/CT) grid—comprising border fencing, electronic surveillance, drones, and physical domination through patrols & layered deployment of troops—the elusive goal of zero infiltration somehow remains out of reach. While against all the odds, Security Forces have succeeded in drastically reducing infiltration, eliminating it is operationally & strategically unachievable.
To substantiate this difficult statement, it is essential first to understand the infiltrators’ modus operandi and the conditions that enable their infiltration attempts to succeed.
The group of terrorists, after receiving weapons training & being equipped with automatic rifles AK/M4 (and in some cases pistols), ammunition, hand grenades, other war-like stores & cash (frequently counterfeit) – move to the launch pads. There are a large number of launchpads (generally co-located with Pakistan Army forward posts) all along the LoC. These forward posts reportedly look after the logistical needs of the terrorists, including supplying them with ghee-rich parathas prior to launch so that they can sustain themselves for several days. They typically remain at these launch pads for one to five days before being pushed across the LoC, with direct or indirect assistance from Pakistan’s military.
Infiltration is most frequent when the snow melts and the terrain becomes more passable, although the LoC in the Jammu sector sees attempts year-round. The dynamics along the International Border (IB) in Jammu are different and require separate consideration. Across sectors, the launchpads run along the LoC and – whether directly or indirectly – are sustained by Pakistani Army or Ranger support. Infiltration attempts are indeed coordinated by ISI handlers personally, making this game increasingly challenging.
Historically, guides were indispensable, and their numbers varied with the size of the party. New guides are being recruited; old guides are kept out of the loop to avoid loss of surprise & compromising the security of plans. Today, however, technical aids such as GPS devices are increasingly used alongside or instead of guides, simplifying navigation and improving the likelihood of success. These devices are often preloaded with waypoints given as precise grid references; during one such interrogation, I had encountered a very young, minimally educated infiltrator who nevertheless recited multiple ten-figure grid coordinates and carried maps as well marked with those points.
The Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS—the border fence) is regularly challenged; determined groups employ various methods to get past it—cutting, climbing, or tunneling—and both sides continuously adapt techniques and counters. Seemingly minor clues—for example, the smell of kerosene or cooking oil—can betray troop locations, prompting infiltrators to alter routes and avoid detection. They are often met by local receiving groups from the hinterland that guide and escort them through this difficult terrain from AIOS onwards, which complicates tracking and interdiction by Security Forces.
Difficult terrain conditions, especially nullahs, re-entrants, and thick forests, threat of sniping and standoffattacks by the enemy on security forces; ambushes and patrols in the immediate vicinity of the LoC as well as in areas under observation and the effective firing range of weapons; and enhanced skill levels of intruders in rock craft and obstacles continue to add complexities to security forces operations and thus always keep them on edge.
Three major aspects that mainly contribute to the multiplying challenges for security forces in fully eliminating infiltration are :
Technology & Human Ingenuity Limitations: India has erected a robust multi-tiered counter-infiltration grid – fencing with sensors, thermal imagers, UAVs, ground surveillance radars, and quick reaction teams. While these measures have drastically reduced infiltration, they are not impenetrable. Adversaries constantly evolve their tactics, using GPS navigation, satellite phones, night-vision devices, and even tunnels. Currently, terrorists & the Pakistan Army’s collusion is exploiting drones and surveillance devices to ascertain patterns of Security Forces patrols, viz., their timings, strength, routes and identify the gaps. Infiltration is attempted during bad weather conditions along the trail, not explored earlier under continuous guidance and surveillance by drones, observation posts, and other surveillance devices. Human determination and the element of surprise—combined with insider support in some areas—make it impossible to guarantee that every single infiltration attempt will be eliminated/foiled.
The Harsh Terrain Advantage: The LoC stretches over 740 km, cutting across rugged mountains, deep ravines, thick forests, and snow-bound passes. This unforgiving terrain offers infiltrators multiple natural cover options. Even with state-of-the-art surveillance systems, visibility and monitoring are severely hampered by fog, heavy snow, dense vegetation, and rapidly changing weather conditions. Small gaps in coverage are enough for highly trained infiltrators to slip through. Unlike a flat desert frontier, no fencing or electronic grid can provide foolproof protection across such terrain.
The Perpetual Push by Pakistan : Zero infiltration is also unattainable because infiltration is not a random occurrence; it is state-sponsored and institutionalised. Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain invested in sustaining cross-border terrorism as a low-cost, high-impact tool of asymmetric warfare. Launch pads across the LoC are regularly maintained, with infiltrators receiving training, arms, and guidance. Even when infiltration routes are neutralised or heavily guarded, Pakistan adapts by opening new ones. The sheer persistence of this effort means that infiltration will continue, regardless of India’s preventive measures. Further, the lure of easy money through cross-border narco business is keeping the nexus of guides, OGWs, and fence-sitters invested in infiltration despite a high attrition rate & dangers involved.
But there is definitely a dilemma with the enemy on the attempted infiltration along the LoC. Pakistan’s ISI, in the meantime, found other easier routes along the IB to infiltrate terrorists in small numbers. Consequently, their overall focus keeps shifting to the IB sector with new avenues like tunnels, drones, and narco sympathizers in areas where police and Border Guarding Forces are involved in routine policing duties, and presence is minimal.
Notwithstanding, there has been an immersive push towards the absorption of technology by the Indian Army. Each soldier today is skilled in one or the other force multiplier skills from Al, autonomous detection systems, microwave radar coverage for bad weather, all-weather drones from surveillance to strike options, and new weapons (AK 203), combined with AIOS, which has been smartened with day and night cameras for 24 by 7 surveillance, autonomous detection, and engagement options.
Zero infiltration is definitely a desirable goal, but it is not a realistic one, and across the LoC in J&K, however, it is unachievable because of three overlapping realities, as explained: the harsh terrain, Pakistan’s unrelenting sponsorship, and the inherent limits of technology and human control. What India can—and has successfully done—is to reduce infiltration to a trickle, maintain a strong counter-terrorism grid inside Kashmir, and ensure that infiltration no longer alters the security dynamics as it once did. Victory in this long battle lies not in claiming absolute prevention but in rendering infiltration strategically futile. However, what we need is zero tolerance towards terror and curbing terror.
The Reality of “Minimal, Not Zero” : In security parlance, the realistic goal is not zero infiltration but minimal infiltration with maximal neutralisation. The emphasis is on ensuring that very few terrorists succeed in entering, and those who do are identified, tracked, and eliminated swiftly within the hinterland. Over the years, infiltration numbers have fallen drastically compared to the 1990s, but the persistence of even small numbers of infiltrators shows that complete eradication is beyond reach.