The latest allegations emerging from Taksing circle situated in Arunachal Pradesh’s border with China, if proven true, may result in heavier troop deployments in the eastern Himalayas.
The Nah Welfare Society, representing indigenous communities in Upper Subansiri district, has accused the People’s Liberation Army of gradually occupying traditional grazing lands and hunting grounds near Taksing, north of the Subansiri River.
In a letter to local authorities, the group alleged that Chinese forces have built roads, bridges and military camps in areas that local residents say they accessed freely until only a few years ago.
There have been similar accusations in the past too. While some have been proven false as the PLA had remained within the loosely penciled 890-km long McMohan line, others such as the famous Sumdorong Chu standoff, were genuine cases of China overstepping into Arunachal.
The Sumdorong Chu incident occurred in 1986 when Gen K Sundarji ordered the airlift of Indian troops and artillery to take over a grazing ground in the high Himalayas and followed it up with Operation Chequerboard, all along the eastern border in 1987 to demonstrate to China, India’s military preparedness.
China claims most of Arunchanal Pradesh, claiming it as “South Tibet” and routinely announces new names for various peaks and areas in Arunachal in what can be called a “cartographic claim creation”.
The problem, military analysts say is that over the years, China has “dramatically expanded its network of all-weather roads, airfields, bridges and dual-use villages across the Tibetan plateau.” Improved infrastructure enables Beijing to patrol disputed areas more frequently while reducing India’s response time.
Many Indian strategic thinkers interpret this behaviour through the prism of the so-called “Five Fingers of Tibet” theory, which is widely attributed to China’s strongman Mao Zedong in 1949, though never formalised in any official Chinese policy document.
The concept portrays Tibet as the “palm” from which influence extends into Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. While historians continue to debate its doctrinal significance, the framework remains influential because it appears to mirror China’s attempted expansion of strategic footprints across the Himalayan arc.
The historical backdrop is equally significant. British India viewed Tibet as a buffer against imperial Russia and sought to preserve its autonomy. That strategic geography disappeared after the People’s Republic of China incorporated Tibet in 1950, transforming what had long been an Indo-Tibetan frontier into a direct Sino-Indian border stretching nearly 3,500 kilometres.
Besides, disputes with India over Arunachal and Ladakh, China has also routinely intruded into Nepal, as has been documented by a 2021 Nepalese government document which was leaked as also a lawmaker’s investigation. Border pillars had been destroyed, infrastructure built deep inside Nepal in Humla and Sindhupalchowk districts.
Similarly, China claims about 269 sqkm of territory in Doklam plateuau (Western Bhutan), 495 sqkm of territory in Jakarlung and Pasarlung valleys (Central Bhutan) and 650 sqkm in Sakteng (Eastern Bhutan)
Many analysts feel the Tibet question lies at the heart of all these Chinese claims and hence Mao’s unauthenticated statement, “Tibet is the palm, which we must occupy. Then we will go after the five fingers.”
For India, the challenge extends beyond strengthening military deployments. It increasingly involves ensuring that frontier communities remain populated, economically viable and politically connected. Local residents often serve as the earliest witnesses to changes on the ground that satellites or diplomatic exchanges detect only later.