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Travails of the Rohingyas

Mention the Treaty of Yandaboo to any reasonably well-informed Indian and in all probability he will draw a blank even…

Travails of the Rohingyas

Representational image (Photo: IANS)

Mention the Treaty of Yandaboo to any reasonably well-informed Indian and in all probability he will draw a blank even when the plight of the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine province of Myanmar has been the focus of the global media.

This correspondent, however, was made aware of this treaty soon after arriving in Jorhat on being posted to Assam in 1967. Under the terms of the Treaty, signed in 1826 at Yandaboo, near Rangoon, the Burmese king ceded the Ahom kingdom he conquered in 1810 to the British following the Burmese defeat in the first Anglo Burmese War of 1824.

Thus, Assam, the territory of the Ahom kingdom, was made a part of Bengal Presidency — the “British bridgehead” in India. One also learnt about the horrifying atrocities committed by the occupying Burmese on the hapless people of Assam during their brief rule from 1816-17 to 1826, which form a part of Assamese folklore and memory.

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The Treaty further ensured the withdrawal of Burmese sway from Manipur and Cachar, now a part of Assam, and transfer of the Lower Burma areas of Arakan, now Rakhine and Tenasserim, to Bengal Presidency — A long coastal strip along the high hills, covered with sub-tropical rain forests and teak, minerals and endowed with varieties of marine resources and deep sea natural harbours.

The Treaty shaped the history of the North-east, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, as it strengthened British control over the Bay of Bengal and brought the British close to Rangoon, the Burmese capital. Arakan remained a district of Bengal till 1885, when the British took over upper Burma following the second Anglo Burmese War and made Burma a separate province of British India.

The Rohingya story also began from 1826 when, in recognition of the logistical support provided by the Chittagong Muslims as “Lashkars” to the advancing British forces to Burma during the war, the new government and British companies engaged them in Arakan in “extractive” commercial ventures in mining, felling of teak trees and building roads and bridges.

This migration of labour, mostly Muslim from predominantly Musliminhabited neighbouring Chittagong, continued for over a century, much like the way the migrant Adivasi labour sustained rapid growth of tea plantation in Assam, helped the growth and consolidation of the Muslim presence in Arakan.

In the 1872 census, these Muslims were enumerated as Arakan Muslims, though in later records, the British made a distinction between the Burmese Muslims and the Indian Muslims by defining the former as those who inhabited Arakan prior to the arrival of the British.

A recent International Migration Institute study, Number 76 of 2013 by C Pugh, held that a majority of Muslims living in Rakhine today are the descendants of the later migrants from Chittagong, a position heartily endorsed by the Government of Myanmar as it enforced 1826 as the “cut off” point for grant of citizenship.

One must note here that for centuries Rakhine had a political and Buddhist cultural identity, distinct from that of the majority Bamar Buddhists, the dominant among the 135 notified ethnic groups of today — Rohingya is not in this list. The Gazetteer of Eastern Bengal and North East, edited by four ICS scholar civilians led by BC Allen, noted that the “Maghs” as the Arakan Buddhists were known in Bengal, ruled over Chittagong for long spells in the 16th and 17th centuries and even earlier till the Mughals restored their authority in 1666, only to lose it to the British in 1770.

However, Arakan continued to exist as a strong state till 1784 when it was conquered by the Bamar king. In its heyday, Arakan was so powerful that the Muslim rulers of Bengal paid tributes to the Arakan king to avoid pillage of riverine Bengal by joint operations of “Magh and Portuguese pirates”.

This interaction between what is Rakhine now and Chittagong and South Bengal was long and varied, which took a new form after the British takeover of Rakhine. The rapid spread of the colonial mode of production brought Muslim migrants and demographic change.

Nevertheless, the Rakhine Buddhists have been steadfast in assertion of their Buddhist cultural and political identity and fiercely opposed any dilution of their power and authority in Rakhine even when the Muslims acquired in the North Rakhine some features of a “geo-political minority” — a minority group in Rakhine but a majority in areas bordering what became East Pakistan and developed a sense of power.

Thus, emboldened by partition and the ease with which East Pakistan survived and got away with regular persecution of the Hindu minority, whose presence got reduced to just 10 per cent of the population from 26 per cent at the time of partition, some Muslim settlers of Rakhine in the 1950s started to advocate for the northern part “to become an autonomous Muslim zone or alternatively merge with East Pakistan” as brought out in a recent ISPW strategy Series study, issue Number 485 May 2017.

It also observed that “in choosing the name Rohingya the Muslim insurgents known as Muhjahid identified themselves with the history and geography of the Rakhine state and thereby aimed to legitimise their fight for autonomy.” Against this backdrop the Rohingya, as a distinct group, have their origin first and foremost in a political movement that emerged from a separatist movement and since then has been reinforced by their shared suffering. It is therefore, not realistic to look at it as only a “humanitarian” issue or a human rights issue of denial of citizenship.

No doubt that the issue has been simmering, for about eight lakh Rohingya Muslims have been in Bangladesh following violence in 1978, 1991 and 1992, including over four lakh after the crackdown last August and a good number must have melted in with the Muslim majority districts of Assam, Bengal and North Bihar.

Though the problem was aggravated by the decision of the Myanmar Army-led state in 1982 to withdraw citizenship altogether, the real issue is a continuing trust deficit between the Buddhist majority and the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine caused to a great extent by the Rohingya separatist movement, which stands no chance of success given the terrain and the asymmetry of power and the stand taken by India and China on the issue of terror.

Further, Bangladesh has still on her hands the stateless stranded Pakistanis -”Bihari Muslims” — since 1972 whom she denied citizenship and ironically who were rejected by Pakistan. The Pakistani support could only cause further damage to the Rohingya cause and the experience of Muslim insurgencies in the Philippines and Thailand is not encouraging either.

In this scenario the UN Secretary General’s call to Myanmar to stop military operation in Rakhine and facilitate the return of refugees seems to be the only sensible course for the international community to adopt. To begin this peace process, the Rohingya Muslims must disband their armed outfits and seek a negotiated settlement of the citizenship issue under the auspices of the UN.

From a North-east perspective, restoration of peace in Rakhine is critical for completion and functioning of the Kaladan multi-modal project, including upgradation of the historic Akyab — now Sittwe port — to provide the region an access to the sea.

The Rohingya problem underlines the geopolitical importance of “Bengal border lands” and the North-east for security and development of eastern India and the unfinished task of “nation and state building” in multiethnic and multi-religious Myanmar.

In the situation that prevails in Myanmar today, the UN efforts to restore democracy appear to be a case of putting the cart before the horse. The travails of the Rohingya also underline how nearly impossible it is to remove a settled rural population by any state even when there is evidence of their “illegal” presence.

The real challenge before Myanmar’s leaders is to initiate a national peace and reconciliation process involving all warring ethnic groups, including the Rohingya Muslims. It is thus time now for the nation to convene the 21st century Panglong conference to begin the reconstruction of Myanmar as a modern state founded on the rule of law, justice and equity.

The writer is a retired IAS officer of the Assam-Meghalaya cadre and has served as a scientific consultant in the office of the principal scientific advisor to the government of India.

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