In an unusually forthright demarche, the Government of Bhutan has voiced its strong objections to Chinese plans to construct a road in the area of the India-China-Bhutan trijunction near a place called Doklam that leads on to a nearby Bhutanese military camp.

The statement from Bhutan says that China has been asked to desist and to maintain the status quo, as is enjoined in the bilateral agreement between the two parties.

However, China has not shown flexibility in its response and has claimed that the area has been a part of its territory since ancient times.

It has also in effect enlarged the differences by asserting through its spokesman that there is a ‘hidden agenda’ and no ‘third party’ ~ meaning India ~ should be drawn into the matter. India has given a careful response so that matters should not unnecessarily escalate, while Bhutan after its initial protest has maintained diplomatic restraint.

Indeed, the uncharacteristically direct manner in which it has raised the matter is in itself indicative of serious concern. These differences on the Sino-Bhutan border have flared up unexpectedly for reasons that are not readily fathomed.

There have been numerous rounds of talks between the two countries in order to resolve existing differences on the border and though the problems have not been eliminated, diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter continue and have been proceeding for many years.

At an early stage, India had something to contribute but since then Bhutan has been in direct contact and has independently handled its concerns with China. It may have been expected that discussions without third party involvement could be more productive and encourage China to show the required flexibility but that is not how it turned out.

The areas under discussion in Bhutan-China border talks are not extensive and mainly comprise high altitude grazing areas for livestock like yaks, where traditional rights of the graziers have been established for generations, so it could have been supposed that settling the issue would not have presented any great problems.

The Chinese have been loath however to give way to their very much smaller neighbour or to show the accommodating spirit that might have been expected, with the result that what could have been a simple matter has stretched out and has caused unexpected difficulties. Discussions between the two countries have been conducted through designated representatives in the absence of full diplomatic relations between them.

Though diplomatically active when required, as in the present case, Bhutan has deliberately refrained from establishing full relations with major powers, being unwilling to be drawn into their frequent jockeying for advantage over each other, from which it feels it has nothing to gain.

China has chafed at Bhutan’s diplomatic aloofness and would like to establish more extensive relations but has not been able to convince Thimphu of the need.

The latest contretemps in Doklam will no doubt discourage any move to develop relations, the immediate concern being restoration of the status quo as demanded by Bhutan. Beyond Doklam there are other issues that have caused concern and revived strategic anxieties in this sensitive part of the border.

This is the furthest part of the Chumbi valley south of the Himalayan crest between Sikkim and Bhutan, and therefore in some respects a gateway to India.

If Bhutan does not wish to see Chinese motor roads in the area, the same is true of India ~ if anything, India may have more reason to be cautious, given the tangled history of its relations with China. The Indian response to these developments has therefore been firm and its position on the status of the border has been made clear.

Though after the initial show of concern there has been little escalation, there are reports of each side strengthening its position on the ground, and there have also been incidents of pushing and shoving personnel from the other side, which cannot but carry the risk of the situation deteriorating.

One immediate adverse result of these developments is that China has brought to a halt the pilgrim traffic from the Nathu La pass to the religious sites of Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet. Passage along this route, which has long been in abeyance, was reopened not so long ago although it is probably the most convenient road for pilgrims and avoids the strenuous, sometimes dangerous alternative that involves trekking across much higher passes in other parts of the Himalayas.

Historically, the way into Tibet through Nathu La has been the preferred route for trade and for general movement between eastern parts of India and Tibet.

Nor is there any dispute about the border alignment so far as the Sikkim-Chumbi portion is concerned for it was agreed by mutual consent as long ago as 1890 between China and the British and has been operative ever since.

It is the Chinese decision to extend their reach and to strengthen their strategic hold that has caused anxiety within the region and disturbed the prevailing tranquility. In recent years, China has been very active in building roads into the Himalayan region, so that the mountain fastness has become accessible as it never was in earlier times.

The most striking developments in this respect have taken place in Nepal where quite a few regional thoroughfares and infrastructure projects are expected to take shape in the coming years. Tibet has already been opened up with roads and railways that link it more firmly with China’s major centres. Elsewhere too in its remote regions and along its periphery China has developed roads and other infrastructure at an unprecedented rate.

Ambitious, sometimes spectacular development of infrastructure has China’s signature pattern of economic development. In the area of current concern to its neighbours roads and railways into the Chumbi valley are expected soon to take shape, with transformative effect on the region as a whole. Such rapid and decisive opening up has many implications, including matters of strategic import.

India has also been active in improving access and economic development in its border areas, with the result that the once remote mountainous region of India’s periphery is now not so distant from other parts of the country and development activity has become much more earnest.

Inevitably, opening to the outside world, brings with it a new set of security and strategic concerns, with their own challenges.

The developments in Doklam contain echoes of these events that are now taking place in the region as a whole. The Doklam matter itself has placed Bhutan in the forefront but it is also a warning sign for India.

It enjoins enhanced alertness and acts as a reminder of the sensitivity of the trijunction and the area around it. 

The writer is India's former Foreign Secretary