After the terror strikes which killed over 100 innocents in a week spread across Pakistan, the country’s army announced with much fanfare the launch of Operation ‘Rad-ul-Fasaad’, the latest in a series of crackdowns against terror groups. The aim of the operation, as announced by Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) is “indiscriminately eliminating residual and latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders”. The press release went on to state that it would involve the participation of the military, civilian armed forces and intelligence agencies. Interestingly, it was announced by the army, not the government, as would be the norm in a democracy.

In Punjab, the operations would be under the control of the Rangers, an organization officered by the army but for the international community under the aegis of the ministry of interior (akin to India’s Assam Rifles). The fear in the country was so palpable that the final of the Pakistan Cricket League in Lahore was conducted under a five-tier security with almost curfew-like conditions across the city. The markets were forcibly closed, spectators went through a three-tier security check and the army and Rangers were deployed across the city.

As a precursor, in Jun 2014, post the Taliban attack on Karachi airport, the Pakistan army launched Operation Zarb-e-azb, seeking to eliminate terrorist groups active in North Waziristan. By September, it claimed to have eliminated over 3,500 militants and arrested untold numbers as part of the operation, facts which cannot be independently confirmed. However, the continuing series of terror strikes after the so-claimed successful operations, proved that it only provided temporary relief to the country, as anti-Pakistan terror outfits re-grouped and launched strikes with greater vigour. The present operation too may turn out to be on similar lines.

This operation is concentrated in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Baluchistan and Punjab. As part of the operations, Pakistan launched air and artillery strikes in remote areas of FATA and Baluchistan as also across the border into Afghanistan, seeking to destroy militant hideouts. It simultaneously deported thousands of Afghan refugees living in the country for decades on suspicion of being terror supporters. Further, in Punjab the searches targeted mainly colonies occupied by Pakhtuns or Afghans. Thus the operation commenced by profiling specific communities as being supporters of terror groups.

The launch of air and artillery strikes and closing border crossings with Afghanistan has only worsened ties between the countries. Pakistan believes that Afghan intelligence agencies, in collusion with the Indian RAW, are responsible for terror strikes. The Pakistan army gave a list of over 70 known militants located in Afghanistan to be arrested and handed over. In reply, Afghanistan gave its list of 85 terrorists on Pakistani soil. It was just tit for tat.
The fact remains that Afghan forces have limited control over remote border areas and are already too stretched handling Taliban assaults across the country to respond to Pakistan’s air and artillery barrages. These strikes only forced Afghan residents living close to the border to flee from their homes in fear.

The operations supported by firepower would result in collateral casualties to innocents, besides destroying their homes and shelters, further alienating the population. With most operations being conducted in remote areas, claims of success are announced through press releases by ISPR and hence would be one sided. On the first day of operations, ISPR claimed Pakistan had killed over 100, which is unlikely. Most of those arrested in the roundups are either Pakhtuns or Afghans.

The profiling of the population and high-handedness of the approach would benefit terror groups and increase problems for Pakistan. In Baluchistan, to subdue the independence uprising, Pakistan employed brute force, resulting in it losing control of the region. A similar situation may emerge this time. In a report published in an online magazine, Afghan refugees pushed back into Afghanistan have claimed that since they lack funds for basic survival they have no option but to join the ISIS for earning revenue. These refugees have lived for decades in Pakistan and are well versed with the topography and security infrastructure. Their joining terror groups would only heighten security problems.Internal pressure on the country is such that it is compelled to revive military courts to deal with terror suspects.

Terror groups which Pakistan once considered as strategic assets have now splintered and returned to haunt the nation. Both the ISIS and Pakistan Taliban operate along the almost open and inaccessible Pak-Afghan border, where tribal loyalties dominate state control. As pressure increases, they shift deeper into Afghanistan, regroup and await an opportunity to return. Force alone can never eliminate terror groups, as has been proved in every counter-terror operation, across the globe. It requires deft political handling alongside application of force.

The Pakistan government’s National Action Plan (NAP) had involved a combination of both. Critics within the country have repeatedly questioned the lack of implementation of the NAP in the conduct of operations, leaving it solely to the army to handle, hence unlikely to succeed.

After decades, India has barely been able to control the militancy in Kashmir, despite following a multi-pronged approach including trying to win hearts and minds. Indian soldiers have fought militants at great cost, with hands tied behind their backs, suffering casualties while avoiding damage to civilian property.

Expecting the Pakistan army, adopting a brute force strategy, to succeed is asking for the impossible. The strategy adopted and profiling of the population would only increase support to terror groups and enhance problems for the state. It is repeating mistakes of its earlier operation, Zarb-e-azb, which only brought temporary relief. Probably this operation may soothe fears of people for some time, before terror groups return with renewed vigour. After all, the army can only sustain force levels deployed in operation Rad-ul-Fasaad for limited durations.  

The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army