It was no coincidence that just when the trends of vote-counting were causing rejoicing or recrimination across the so-called heartland, Maoist insurgents caused many hearts to miss a beat in the rest of the country. The message to the polity at large was that normality would never prevail until the discord that has long gripped central India, triggering a devastating insurgency, is effectively remedied. That yet another “successful” ambush was conducted in the Sukma region debunked the theory that the government’s carrot-and-stick policy was yielding results.

The firepower unleashed against a CRPF party blasted the myth that demonetisation had crippled terrorist activity, and confirmed the capacity of the Left-wing extremists to hinder development activity intended to drive a wedge between them and the local populace. That 12 members of the paramilitary were mowed down is serious enough, yet the severity of the Maoist strike is not to be evaluated in terms of a head count: the death roll would have been higher had the jawans been moving in larger groups. The small-group operating norm does limit casualties, yet it simultaneously reduces the capacity to mount an immediate and effective counter-strike: significantly there have been no claims of heavy losses having been inflicted on the insurgents. The announcement of enhanced compensation, expressions of sympathy, and a determination to hit back do not really mitigate the gravity of the situation.

There is no evidence to suggest that the CRPF units had been “thinned” to make personnel available for election duties, but it would be safe to assume that the focus of security agencies (the CRPF was “headless” at the time of the strike) was directed toward states having elections. That apart, the CRPF leadership on the ground has been found wanting, yet again. Count has been lost of the number of times the jawans have walked into well-laid traps, and as details emerge of what took place at Sukma on 11 March the tactical competence of the paramilitary raises serious questions: the jawans are always at the receiving end. Is it not time to consider a task force totally dedicated to dismantling the Maoist machine, with its own intelligence-gathering apparatus? The CRPF has too many other tasks on hand to permit the singular attention the “menace” demands.

Unfortunately New Delhi has still to formulate and implement a comprehensive strategy to tackle the cause and effects of the insurgency. It is more than apparent that not only is there is no “military solution”, but that the insurgents display more effective tactics and better use of their weaponry than the paramilitary: raising the hard questions North Block has consistently ducked. It was, in reality, the overall policy of the Central government that was ambushed at Sukma.